Related papers: Strategy Proof Mechanisms for Facility Location in…
We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides which players are going to be serviced and how much each one of them is going to…
The development of positioning technologies has resulted in an increasing amount of mobility data being available. While bringing a lot of convenience to people's life, such availability also raises serious concerns about privacy. In this…
House Allocations concern with matchings involving one-sided preferences, where houses serve as a proxy encoding valuable indivisible resources (e.g. organs, course seats, subsidized public housing units) to be allocated among the agents.…
We consider two-sided matching markets, and study the incentives of agents to circumvent a centralized clearing house by signing binding contracts with one another. It is well-known that if the clearing house implements a stable match and…
We study how the quality dimension affects the social optimum in a model of spatial differentiation where two facilities provide a public service. If quality enters linearly in the individuals' utility function, a symmetric configuration,…
We present a set of five axioms for fairness measures in resource allocation. A family of fairness measures satisfying the axioms is constructed. Well-known notions such as alpha-fairness, Jain's index, and entropy are shown to be special…
Ranked decision systems -- recommenders, ad auctions, clinical triage queues -- must decide when to intervene in ranked outputs and when to abstain. We study when confidence-based abstention monotonically improves decision quality, and when…
We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings, while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this…
This position paper argues that enforcing LLM agent safety within a single abstraction layer is not merely suboptimal but categorically insufficient for deployed LLM agents -- a structural consequence of how agent execution works, not a…
Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Unlike existing settings, we allow each agent to specify requirements to only…
Euclidean distance matrix optimization with ordinal constraints (EDMOC) has found important applications in sensor network localization and molecular conformation. It can also be viewed as a matrix formulation of multidimensional scaling,…
This paper deals with a bilevel approach of the location-allocation problem with dimensional facilities. We present a general model that allows us to consider very general shapes of domains for the dimensional facilities and we prove the…
In the setting where information cannot be verified, we propose a simple yet powerful information theoretical framework---the Mutual Information Paradigm---for information elicitation mechanisms. Our framework pays every agent a measure of…
We study a model of competition among nomadic agents for time-varying and location-specific resources, arising in crowd-sourced transportation services, online communities, and traditional location-based economic activity. This model…
We examine the behavior of multi-agent networks where information-sharing is subject to a positive communications cost over the edges linking the agents. We consider a general mean-square-error formulation where all agents are interested in…
We consider the geo-indistinguishability approach to location privacy, and the trade-off with respect to utility. We show that, given a desired degree of geo-indistinguishability, it is possible to construct a mechanism that minimizes the…
A preference profile with m alternatives and n voters is 2-dimensional Euclidean if both the alternatives and the voters can be placed into a 2-dimensional space such that for each pair of alternatives, every voter prefers the one which has…
Recent work has constructed economic mechanisms that are both truthful and differentially private. In these mechanisms, privacy is treated separately from the truthfulness; it is not incorporated in players' utility functions (and doing so…
Sharing or publishing social network data while accounting for privacy of individuals is a difficult task due to the interconnectedness of nodes in networks. A key question in k-anonymity, a widely studied notion of privacy, is how to…
We consider multiple-type housing markets (Moulin, 1995), which extend Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) from one dimension to higher dimensions. In this model, Pareto efficiency is incompatible with individual…