Related papers: Algorithmic Persuasion with Evidence
We consider a dynamic model of Bayesian persuasion in which information takes time and is costly for the sender to generate and for the receiver to process, and neither player can commit to their future actions. Persuasion may totally…
If a sender in a persuasion game can use a sequence of experiments rather than a single experiment, does this change the sender's value? We show that the sender can benefit more from dynamic persuasion than from static persuasion when the…
How to optimally persuade an agent who has a private type? When elicitation is feasible, this amounts to a fairly standard principal-agent-style mechanism design problem, where the persuader employs a mechanism to first elicit the agent's…
In this paper, we study axiomatic foundations of Bayesian persuasion, where a principal (i.e., sender) delegates the task of choice making after informing a biased agent (i.e., receiver) about the payoff relevant uncertain state (see, e.g.,…
I study a model of costly Bayesian persuasion by a privately and partially informed sender who conducts a public experiment. The cost of running an experiment is the expected reduction of a weighted log-likelihood ratio function of the…
We study continuous-time persuasion where a sender controls both how informative a signal is over time and when to stop providing information to a receiver. Given an exogenous signal process, the sender can both garble the evolving signal…
We study a long-run persuasion problem where a long-lived Sender repeatedly interacts with a sequence of short-lived Receivers who may adopt a misspecified model for belief updating. The Sender commits to a stationary information structure,…
Prominent opinion formation models such as the one by Friedkin and Johnsen (FJ) concentrate on the effects of peer pressure on public opinions. In practice, opinion formation is also based on information about the state of the world and…
We study a dynamic game where an expert sends probabilistic forecasts to a decision-maker. The decision-maker verifies these forecasts using a calibration test based on past data. How should the expert send forecasts to maximize her payoff…
We study a sender-receiver model in which the receiver can commit to a decision rule before the sender determines the information policy. The decision rule can depend on the information structure chosen by the sender and the realized…
We study a repeated information design problem faced by an informed sender who tries to influence the behavior of a self-interested receiver. We consider settings where the receiver faces a sequential decision making (SDM) problem. At each…
Deception plays a key role in adversarial or strategic interactions for the purpose of self-defence and survival. This paper introduces a general framework and solution to address deception. Most existing approaches for deception consider…
Sender-receiver interactions, and specifically persuasion games, are widely researched in economic modeling and artificial intelligence. However, in the classic persuasion games setting, the messages sent from the expert to the…
Many resources for forensic scholars and practitioners, such as journal articles, guidance documents, and textbooks, address how to make a value of evidence assessment in the form of a likelihood ratio (LR) when deciding between two…
In principal-agent models, a principal offers a contract to an agent to perform a certain task. The agent exerts a level of effort that maximizes her utility. The principal is oblivious to the agent's chosen level of effort, and conditions…
This paper studies algorithmic decision-making under human's strategic behavior, where a decision maker uses an algorithm to make decisions about human agents, and the latter with information about the algorithm may exert effort…
We study a Bayesian persuasion setting in which the receiver is trying to match the (binary) state of the world. The sender's utility is partially aligned with the receiver's, in that conditioned on the receiver's action, the sender derives…
We introduce an evolutionary game with feedback between perception and reality, which we call the reality game. It is a game of chance in which the probabilities for different objective outcomes (e.g., heads or tails in a coin toss) depend…
This work studies a dynamic mechanism design problem in which a principal delegates decision makings to a group of privately-informed agents without the monetary transfer or burning. We consider that the principal privately possesses…
An important research thread in algorithmic game theory studies the design of efficient truthful mechanisms that approximate the optimal social welfare. A fundamental question is whether an \alpha-approximation algorithm translates into an…