Related papers: Algorithmic Persuasion with Evidence
Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relevant state drawn independently and identically from an…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for choosing Sender's preferred action, and Sender has maxmin preferences over all Receiver type distributions with known mean and bounds. This…
We study finite-state communication games in which the sender's preference is perturbed by random private idiosyncrasies. Persuasion is generically impossible within the class of statistically independent sender/receiver preferences --…
A sender first publicly commits to an experiment and then can privately run additional experiments and selectively disclose their outcomes to a receiver. The sender has private information about the maximal number of additional experiments…
We consider a persuasion problem between a sender and a receiver whose utility may be nonlinear in her belief; we call such receivers risk-conscious. Such utility models arise when the receiver exhibits systematic biases away from…
In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender, who observes a state, commits to a randomized signaling scheme that guides a self-interested receiver's actions. Classical models assume the receiver knows the commitment. We, instead, study the…
The Bayesian persuasion model studies communication between an informed sender and a receiver with a payoff-relevant action, emphasizing the ability of a sender to extract maximal surplus from his informational advantage. In this paper we…
We consider the multi-sender persuasion problem: multiple players with informational advantage signal to convince a single self-interested actor to take certain actions. This problem generalizes the seminal Bayesian Persuasion framework and…
A principal designs an algorithm that generates a publicly observable prediction of a binary state. She must decide whether to act directly based on the prediction or to delegate the decision to an agent with private information but…
We study Bayesian persuasion under approximate best response, where the receiver may choose any action that is not too much suboptimal given their posterior belief upon receiving the signal. We focus on the computational aspects of the…
This paper develops a data-driven approach to Bayesian persuasion. The receiver is privately informed about the prior distribution of the state of the world, the sender knows the receiver's preferences but does not know the distribution of…
We consider a Bayesian persuasion or information design problem where the sender tries to persuade the receiver to take a particular action via a sequence of signals. This we model by considering multi-phase trials with different…
In many real-world scenarios, experts must convey complex information with limited message capacity. This paper explores how the availability of messages influences an expert's persuasive ability. We develop a geometric representation of…
We frame dynamic persuasion in a partial observation stochastic control Leader-Follower game with an ergodic criterion. The Receiver controls the dynamics of a multidimensional unobserved state process. Information is provided to the…
Bayesian persuasion and its derived information design problem has been one of the main research agendas in the economics and computation literature over the past decade. However, when attempting to apply its model and theory, one is often…
We explore whether ambiguous communication can be beneficial to the sender in a persuasion problem, when the receiver (and possibly the sender) is ambiguity averse. Our analysis highlights the necessity of using a collection of experiments…
We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…
In the Bayesian persuasion model, a sender can convince a receiver to choose an alternative action to the one originally preferred by the receiver. A crucial assumption in this model is the sender's commitment to a predetermined information…
The ability to persuade others is critical to professional and personal success. However, crafting persuasive messages is demanding and poses various challenges. We conducted nine exploratory case studies to identify adaptations that…