Related papers: Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule
With increasingly favorable economics and bundling of different grid services, energy storage systems (ESS) are expected to play a key role in integrating renewable generation. This work considers the coordination of ESS owned by customers…
This paper studies an energy storage (ES) sharing model which is cooperatively invested by multiple buildings for harnessing on-site renewable utilization and grid price arbitrage. To maximize the economic benefits, we jointly consider the…
We study a networked economic system composed of $n$ producers supplying a single homogeneous good to a number of geographically separated markets and of a centralized authority, called the market maker. Producers compete \`a la Cournot, by…
This paper investigates the social optimum for a dynamic linear quadratic collective choice problem where a group of agents choose among multiple alternatives or destinations. The agents' common objective is to minimize the average cost of…
Bargaining networks model social or economic situations in which agents seek to form the most lucrative partnership with another agent from among several alternatives. There has been a flurry of recent research studying Nash bargaining…
In bandwidth allocation, competing agents wish to transmit data along paths of links in a network, and each agent's utility is equal to the minimum bandwidth she receives among all links in her desired path. Recent market mechanisms for…
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum…
We provide a strategic model of the formation of production networks that subsumes the standard general equilibrium approach. The objective of firms in our setting is to choose their supply relationships so as to maximize their profit at…
This paper introduces an equilibrium framework based on sequential sampling in which players face strategic uncertainty over their opponents' behavior and acquire informative signals to resolve it. Sequential sampling equilibrium delivers a…
We study combinatorial auctions where each item is sold separately but simultaneously via a second price auction. We ask whether it is possible to efficiently compute in this game a pure Nash equilibrium with social welfare close to the…
In this paper we introduce the concept of split Nash equilibrium problems associated with two related noncooperative strategic games. Then we apply the Fan-KKM theorem to prove the existence of solutions to split Nash equilibrium problems…
The productivity of a common pool of resources may degrade when overly exploited by a number of selfish investors, a situation known as the tragedy of the commons (TOC). Without regulations, agents optimize the size of their individual…
With the advent of prosumers, the traditional centralized operation may become impracticable due to computational burden, privacy concerns, and conflicting interests. In this paper, an energy sharing mechanism is proposed to accommodate…
Generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problems are commonly used to model strategic interactions between self-interested agents who are coupled in cost and constraints. Specifically, the variational GNE, a refinement of the GNE, is often…
This paper addresses a class of Nash equilibrium (NE) seeking problems in coalition games involving both local and coupling constraints for multiple Euler-Lagrange (EL) systems subject to disturbances of unknown bounds. Within each…
We construct Nash equilibria in feedback form for a class of two-person stochastic games of singular control with absorption, arising from a stylized model for corporate finance. More precisely, the paper focusses on a strategic dynamic…
Sharing economy is a distributed peer-to-peer economic paradigm, which gives rise to a variety of social interactions for economic purposes. One fundamental distributed decision-making process is coalition formation for sharing certain…
Much work has been done on the computation of market equilibria. However due to strategic play by buyers, it is not clear whether these are actually observed in the market. Motivated by the observation that a buyer may derive a better…
We consider the problem in which n items arrive to a market sequentially over time, where two agents compete to choose the best possible item. When an agent selects an item, he leaves the market and obtains a payoff given by the value of…
We consider a symmetric two-player contest, in which the choice set of effort is constrained. We apply a fundamental property of the payoff function to show that, under standard assumptions, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium in pure…