Related papers: Lindahl Equilibrium as a Collective Choice Rule
We consider a class of dynamic collective choice models with social interactions, whereby a large number of non-uniform agents have to individually settle on one of multiple discrete alternative choices, with the relevance of their would-be…
We study linear Fisher markets with satiation. In these markets, sellers have earning limits and buyers have utility limits. Beyond natural applications in economics, these markets arise in the context of maximizing Nash social welfare when…
Experimental economics has repeatedly demonstrated that the Nash equilibrium makes inaccurate predictions for a vast set of games. Instead, several alternative theoretical concepts predict behavior that is much more in tune with observed…
In this paper we investigate Nash equilibrium payoffs for two-player nonzero-sum stochastic differential games whose cost functionals are defined by a system of coupled backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence…
We study a recommendation system where sellers compete for visibility by strategically offering commissions to a platform that optimally curates a ranked menu of items and their respective prices for each customer. Customers interact…
We study competition between firms in labor markets, following a combinatorial model suggested by Kelso and Crawford [1982]. In this model, each firm is trying to recruit workers by offering a higher salary than its competitors, and its…
We generalize the classic problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to the problem of \emph{fair public decision making}, in which a decision must be made on several social issues simultaneously, and, unlike the classic setting, a…
This paper investigates the efficiency loss in social cost caused by strategic bidding behavior of individual participants in a supply-demand balancing market, and proposes a mechanism to fully recover equilibrium social optimum via…
Nash`s classical bargaining solution suggests that n players in a non-cooperative bargaining situation should find a solution that maximizes the product of each player's utility functions. We consider a special case: Suppose that the…
We investigate stochastic differential games of optimal trading comprising a finite population. There are market frictions in the present framework, which take the form of stochastic permanent and temporary price impacts. Moreover,…
Walrasian equilibrium is a prominent market equilibrium notion, but rarely exists in markets with indivisible items. We introduce a new market equilibrium notion, called two-price equilibrium (2PE). A 2PE is a relaxation of Walrasian…
Frequent violations of fair principles in real-life settings raise the fundamental question of whether such principles can guarantee the existence of a self-enforcing equilibrium in a free economy. We show that elementary principles of…
We study surplus division in network constrained bilateral matching markets with transferable utility. We introduce a new solution concept, the credible bargaining solution, which refines stability by requiring that, for each matched pair…
Allocating conflicting jobs among individuals while respecting a budget constraint for each individual is an optimization problem that arises in various real-world scenarios. In this paper, we consider the situation where each individual…
In this paper, a mathematically rigorous solution overturns existing wisdom regarding New Keynesian Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium. I develop a formal concept of stochastic equilibrium. I prove uniqueness and necessity, when agents…
This paper considers incentives to provide goods that are partially shareable along social links. We introduce a model in which each individual in a social network not only decides how much of a shareable good to provide, but also decides…
We study equilibrium concepts in non-cooperative games under uncertainty where both beliefs and mixed strategies are represented by non-additive measures (capacities). In contrast to the classical Nash framework based on additive…
This note shows that under the unrestricted domain, there exists a choice liberal and Nash implementable social choice rule if and only if there are at least three players and the outcome set is at least twice as large as the player set. A…
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…
Although both systems analyzed are described through two theories apparently different (quantum mechanics and game theory) it is shown that both are analogous and thus exactly equivalents. The quantum analogue of the replicator dynamics is…