Related papers: Fair and consistent prize allocation in competitio…

We study tournaments where winning a rank-dependent prize requires passing a minimum performance standard. We show that, for any prize allocation, the optimal standard is always at a mode of performance that is weakly higher than the global…

We study the problem of sharing the revenues from broadcasting sports leagues axiomatically. Our key axiom is anonymity, the classical impartiality axiom. Other impartiality axioms already studied in these problems are equal treatment of…

This paper considers the problem of randomly assigning a set of objects to a set of agents based on the ordinal preferences of agents. We generalize the well-known immediate acceptance algorithm to the afore-mentioned random environments…

We study the optimal allocation of prizes in rank-order tournaments with loss averse agents. Prize sharing becomes increasingly optimal with loss aversion because more equitable prizes reduce the marginal psychological cost of anticipated…

While conventional ranking systems focus solely on maximizing the utility of the ranked items to users, fairness-aware ranking systems additionally try to balance the exposure for different protected attributes such as gender or race. To…

We study $n$-dimensional contests between two players with heterogeneous effort costs, where each dimension (battle) is modeled as a Tullock contest. Prize-allocation rules are identity-independent, budget-balanced, and weakly increasing in…

We study a resource allocation setting where $m$ discrete items are to be divided among $n$ agents with additive utilities, and the agents' utilities for individual items are drawn at random from a probability distribution. Since common…

We consider the discrete assignment problem in which agents express ordinal preferences over objects and these objects are allocated to the agents in a fair manner. We use the stochastic dominance relation between fractional or randomized…

In this paper, we focus on how to dynamically allocate a divisible resource fairly among n players who arrive and depart over time. The players may have general heterogeneous valuations over the resource. It is known that the exact…

We introduce a family of normative principles to assess fairness in the context of participatory budgeting. These principles are based on the fundamental idea that budget allocations should be fair in terms of the resources invested into…

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unanimous fairness, in which…

We study the problem of allocating a finite estate among agents whose total claims exceed the available resources, a standard framework in the theory of claims problems. Two canonical rules embody competing fairness ideals: the Proportional…

We propose a notion of fairness for allocation problems in which different agents may have different reservation utilities, stemming from different outside options, or property rights. Fairness is usually understood as the absence of envy,…

We study a fair division setting in which participants are to be fairly distributed among teams, where not only do the teams have preferences over the participants as in the canonical fair division setting, but the participants also have…

I study symmetric competitions in which each player chooses an arbitrary distribution over a one-dimensional performance index, subject to a convex cost. I establish existence of a symmetric equilibrium, document various properties it must…

We study a new but simple model for online fair division in which indivisible items arrive one-by-one and agents have monotone utilities over bundles of the items. We consider axiomatic properties of mechanisms for this model such as…

Ranking individuals based on their performance in different coalitions is a problem emerging in various domains (teams sports, scientific evaluation, argumentation, etc.). Often, for practical reasons, the number of comparable coalitions is…

We study a contest in which $N$ players sequentially draw from a distribution as many times as they want at a fixed cost per draw, with no recall, and the highest accepted value wins a prize. In the unique symmetric equilibrium, the…

As recommender systems are being designed and deployed for an increasing number of socially-consequential applications, it has become important to consider what properties of fairness these systems exhibit. There has been considerable…

We study stable matching problems in networks where players are embedded in a social context, and may incorporate friendship relations or altruism into their decisions. Each player is a node in a social network and strives to form a good…