Related papers: Game-Theoretic Upper Expectations for Discrete-Tim…

To model discrete-time finite-state uncertain processes, we argue for the use of a global belief model in the form of an upper expectation that is the most conservative one under a set of basic axioms. Our motivation for these axioms, which…

We consider discrete-time uncertain processes with finite state space and study the properties of game-theoretic upper expectations developed by Shafer and Vovk. We start by proving some basic properties, e.g. monotonicity, law of iterated…

We consider three different types of global uncertainty models for discrete-time stochastic processes: measure-theoretic upper expectations, game-theoretic upper expectations and axiomatic upper expectations. The last two are known to be…

We justify and discuss expressions for joint lower and upper expectations in imprecise probability trees, in terms of the sub- and supermartingales that can be associated with such trees. These imprecise probability trees can be seen as…

We propose a sequential optimizing betting strategy in the multi-dimensional bounded forecasting game in the framework of game-theoretic probability of Shafer and Vovk (2001). By studying the asymptotic behavior of its capital process, we…

We introduce a "high probability" framework for repeated games with incomplete information. In our non-equilibrium setting, players aim to guarantee a certain payoff with high probability, rather than in expected value. We provide a high…

This paper makes a small step towards a non-stochastic version of superhedging duality relations in the case of one traded security with a continuous price path. Namely, we prove the coincidence of game-theoretic and measure-theoretic…

We consider two-player stochastic games played on a finite state space for an infinite number of rounds. The games are concurrent: in each round, the two players (player 1 and player 2) choose their moves independently and simultaneously;…

Kolmogorovs axiomatic framework is the best-known approach to describing probabilities and, due to its use of the Lebesgue integral, leads to remarkably strong continuity properties. However, it relies on the specification of a probability…

We study strategic interaction in data-driven games where players face uncertainty about payoff distributions inferred from finite samples. To model calibrated attitudes toward such uncertainty, we formulate distributionally robust games…

In coordination games and speculative over-the-counter financial markets, solutions depend on higher-order average expectations: agents' expectations about what counterparties, on average, expect their counterparties to think, etc. We offer…

We study the limit behaviour of upper and lower bounds on expected time averages in imprecise Markov chains; a generalised type of Markov chain where the local dynamics, traditionally characterised by transition probabilities, are now…

This work contains the mathematical exploration of a few prototypical games in which central concepts from statistics and probability theory naturally emerge. The first two kinds of games are termed Fisher and Bayesian games, which are…

We introduce games with probabilistic uncertainty, a natural model for controller synthesis in which the controller observes the state of the system through imprecise sensors that provide correct information about the current state with a…

The principle that rational agents should maximize expected utility or choiceworthiness is intuitively plausible in many ordinary cases of decision-making under uncertainty. But it is less plausible in cases of extreme, low-probability risk…

Using the game-theoretic framework for probability, Vovk and Shafer. have shown that it is always possible, using randomization, to make sequential probability forecasts that pass any countable set of well-behaved statistical tests. This…

This paper considers for the first time pursuit-evasion (PE) differential games with irrational perceptions of both pursuer and evader on probabilistic characteristics of environmental uncertainty. Firstly, the irrational perceptions of…

Researchers in explainable artificial intelligence have developed numerous methods for helping users understand the predictions of complex supervised learning models. By contrast, explaining the $\textit{uncertainty}$ of model outputs has…

We propose a game-theoretic framework that incorporates both incomplete information and general ambiguity attitudes on factors external to all players. Our starting point is players' preferences on payoff-distribution vectors, essentially…

In this expository paper we illustrate the generality of game theoretic probability protocols of Shafer and Vovk (2001) in finite-horizon discrete games. By restricting ourselves to finite-horizon discrete games, we can explicitly describe…