Related papers: The Price of Anarchy for Instantaneous Dynamic Equ…
We consider a spatially distributed demand for electrical vehicle recharging, that must be covered by a fixed set of charging stations. Arriving EVs receive feedback on transport times to each station, and waiting times at congested ones,…
We study a pricing game in multi-hop relay networks where nodes price their services and route their traffic selfishly and strategically. In this game, each node (1) announces pricing functions which specify the payments it demands from its…
We study a variant of Vickrey's classic bottleneck model. In our model there are $n$ agents and each agent strategically chooses when to join a first-come-first-served observable queue. Agents dislike standing in line and they take actions…
We consider the behavior of the price of anarchy and equilibrium flows in nonatomic multi-commodity routing games as a function of the traffic demand. We analyze their smoothness with a special attention to specific values of the demand at…
In this paper, we study the stability of light traffic achieved by a scheduling algorithm which is suitable for heterogeneous traffic networks. Since analyzing a scheduling algorithm is intractable using the conventional mathematical tool,…
Flows over time enable a mathematical modeling of traffic that changes as time progresses. In order to evaluate these dynamic flows from a game theoretical perspective we consider the price of anarchy (PoA). In this paper we study the…
We consider the well-studied game-theoretic version of machine scheduling in which jobs correspond to self-interested users and machines correspond to resources. Here each user chooses a machine trying to minimize her own cost, and such…
In this paper, we extend the discussion of the price of anarchy of machine scheduling games to a multi-stage machine setting. The multi-stage setting arises naturally in manufacturing pipelines and distributed computing workflows, when each…
We consider the classical machine scheduling, where $n$ jobs need to be scheduled on $m$ machines, and where job $j$ scheduled on machine $i$ contributes $p_{i,j}\in \mathbb{R}$ to the load of machine $i$, with the goal of minimizing the…
Motivated by applications in online marketplaces such as ride-hailing platforms and payment channel networks, we study a single-server queue with state-dependent arrival control. The service operator dynamically chooses the arrival rate as…
Dynamic networks are graphs in which edges are available only at specific time instants, modeling connections that change over time. The dynamic network creation game studies this setting as a strategic interaction where each vertex…
This paper examines the impact of agents' myopic optimization on the efficiency of systems comprised by many selfish agents. In contrast to standard congestion games where agents interact in a one-shot fashion, in our model each agent…
Price of anarchy, the performance ratio, which could characterize the loss of efficiency of the distributed supply chain management compared with the integrated supply chain management is discussed by utilizing newsvendor problem in single…
Standard algorithms for finding the shortest path in a graph require that the cost of a path be additive in edge costs, and typically assume that costs are deterministic. We consider the problem of uncertain edge costs, with potential…
We consider traffic flow dynamics for a network of signalized intersections, where the outflow from every link is constrained to be equal to a given capacity function if the queue length is positive, and equal to the minimum of cumulative…
We study fair mechanisms for the (asymmetric) one-sided allocation problem with m items and n multi-unit demand agents with additive, unit-sum valuations. The symmetric case (m=n), the one-sided matching problem, has been studied…
We consider a model of priced resource sharing that combines both queueing behavior and strategic behavior. We study a priority service model where a single server allocates its capacity to agents in proportion to their payment to the…
We consider the interaction among agents engaging in a driving task and we model it as general-sum game. This class of games exhibits a plurality of different equilibria posing the issue of equilibrium selection. While selecting the most…
We investigate packet routing games in which network users selfishly route themselves through a network over discrete time, aiming to reach the destination as quickly as possible. Conflicts due to limited capacities are resolved by the…
Motivated by recent progress on pricing in the AI literature, we study marketplaces that contain multiple vendors offering identical or similar products and unit-demand buyers with different valuations on these vendors. The objective of…