Related papers: Improved Paths to Stability for the Stable Marriag…
We consider a model of stable edge sets (``matchings'') in a bipartite graph $G=(V,E)$ in which the preferences for vertices of one side (``firms'') are given via choice functions subject to standard axioms of consistency, substitutability…
We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou-Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan-Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112 (2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res., 28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a…
In this paper we show that when individuals in a bipartite network exclusively choose partners and exchange valued goods with their partners, then there exists a set of exchanges that are pair-wise stable. Pair-wise stability implies that…
The maximal matching problem has received considerable attention in the self-stabilizing community. Previous work has given different self-stabilizing algorithms that solves the problem for both the adversarial and fair distributed daemon,…
An influential result by Dor, Halperin, and Zwick (FOCS 1996, SICOMP 2000) implies an algorithm that can compute approximate shortest paths for all vertex pairs in $\tilde{O}(n^{2+O\left(\frac{1}{k}\right )})$ time, ensuring that the output…
In this paper, we study the problem of map matching with travel time constraints. Given a sequence of $k$ spatio-temporal measurements and an embedded path graph with travel time costs, the goal is to snap each measurement to a close-by…
Algorithmic stability is a central concept in statistics and learning theory that measures how sensitive an algorithm's output is to small changes in the training data. Stability plays a crucial role in understanding generalization,…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
In this paper we further investigate the well-studied problem of finding a perfect matching in a regular bipartite graph. The first non-trivial algorithm, with running time $O(mn)$, dates back to K\"{o}nig's work in 1916 (here $m=nd$ is the…
Two-sided manufacturing-as-a-service (MaaS) marketplaces connect clients requesting manufacturing services to suppliers providing those services. Matching mechanisms i.e. allocation of clients' orders to suppliers is a key design parameter…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…
In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…
We adopt the notion of the farsighted stable set to determine which matchings are stable when agents are farsighted in matching markets with couples. We show that a singleton matching is a farsighted stable set if and only if the matching…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
A super-stable matching, which was introduced by Irving, is a solution concept in a variant of the stable matching problem in which the preferences may contain ties. Irving proposed a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem of finding a…
We study dynamic decentralized two-sided matching in which players may encounter unanticipated experiences. As they become aware of these experiences, they may change their preferences over players on the other side of the market.…
We propose a self-stabilizing algorithm for computing a maximal matching in an anonymous network. The complexity is $O(n^3)$ moves with high probability, under the adversarial distributed daemon. In this algorithm, each node can determine…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…
Given a pattern x of length m and a text y of length n, both over an ordered alphabet, the order-preserving pattern matching problem consists in finding all substrings of the text with the same relative order as the pattern. It is an…
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…