Related papers: Improved Paths to Stability for the Stable Marriag…
Motivation: Many biochemical pathways are known, but the numerous parameters required to correctly explore the dynamics of the pathways are not known. For this reason, algorithms that can make inferences by looking at the topology of a…
We introduce a new string matching problem called order-preserving matching on numeric strings where a pattern matches a text if the text contains a substring whose relative orders coincide with those of the pattern. Order-preserving…
We initiate the study of distortion in stable matching. Concretely, we aim to design algorithms that have limited access to the agents' cardinal preferences and compute stable matchings of high quality with respect to some aggregate…
We show that given a SM instance G as input we can find a largest collection of pairwise edge-disjoint stable matchings of G in time linear in the input size. This extends two classical results: 1. The Gale-Shapley algorithm, which can find…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Algorithms for resolving majority cycles in preference aggregation have been studied extensively in computational social choice. Several sophisticated cycle-resolving methods, including Tideman's Ranked Pairs, Schulze's Beat Path, and…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the $k$-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors", or by Euclidean distances…
We thoroughly study a generalized version of the classic Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems where agents may share partners. We consider two prominent stability concepts: ordinal stability [Aharoni and Fleiner, Journal of…
We introduce a novel method for defining geographic districts in road networks using stable matching. In this approach, each geographic district is defined in terms of a center, which identifies a location of interest, such as a post office…
Super-stability is one of the stability concepts in the stable matching problem with ties. It is known that there may not exist a super-stable matching, and the existence of a super-stable matching can be checked in polynomial time. In this…
We study the two-sided stable matching problem with one-sided uncertainty for two sets of agents A and B, with equal cardinality. Initially, the preference lists of the agents in A are given but the preferences of the agents in B are…
A stable filter has the property that it asymptotically `forgets' initial perturbations. As a result of this property, it is possible to construct approximations of such filters whose errors remain small in time, in other words…
We study the stability of the fixed-point solution of an array of mutually coupled logistic maps, focusing on the influence of the delay times, $\tau_{ij}$, of the interaction between the $i$th and $j$th maps. Two of us recently reported…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
We focus on an online 2-stage problem, motivated by the following situation: consider a system where students shall be assigned to universities. There is a first round where some students apply, and a first (stable) matching $M_1$ has to be…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
Stable marriage of a two-sided market with unit demand is a classic problem that arises in many real-world scenarios. In addition, a unique stable marriage in this market simplifies a host of downstream desiderata. In this paper, we explore…
I introduce a stability notion, dynamic stability, for two-sided dynamic matching markets where (i) matching opportunities arrive over time, (ii) matching is one-to-one, and (iii) matching is irreversible. The definition addresses two…
When computing stable matchings, it is usually assumed that the preferences of the agents in the matching market are fixed. However, in many realistic scenarios, preferences change over time. Consequently, an initially stable matching may…