English
Related papers

Related papers: Efficient MDP Analysis for Selfish-Mining in Block…

200 papers

Mining attacks aim to gain an unfair share of extra rewards in the blockchain mining. Selfish mining can preserve discovered blocks and strategically release them, wasting honest miners' computing resources and getting higher profits.…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2024-04-09 Jiaping Yu , Shang Gao , Rui Song , Zhiping Cai , Bin Xiao

In the area of blockchain, numerous methods have been proposed for suppressing intentional forks by attackers more effectively than the random rule. However, all of them, except for the random rule, require major updates, rely on a trusted…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-01-03 Akira Sakurai , Kazuyuki Shudo

Due to its minimal energy requirement the PoS consensus protocol has become an attractive alternative to PoW in modern cryptocurrencies. In this protocol the chance of being selected as a block proposer in each round is proportional to the…

Information Theory · Computer Science 2022-07-26 Zahra Naderi , Seyed Pooya Shariatpanahi , Behnam Bahrak

Proof-of-Work (PoW) systems face critical challenges, including excessive energy consumption and the centralization of mining power among entities with expensive hardware. Static mining pools exacerbate these issues by reducing competition…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-04-25 Rizwanul Haque , SM Tareq Aziz , Tahrim Hossain , Faisal Haque Bappy , Muhammad Nur Yanhaona , Tariqul Islam

Mining blocks on a blockchain equipped with a proof of work consensus protocol is well-known to be resource-consuming. A miner bears the operational cost, mainly electricity consumption and IT gear, of mining, and is compensated by a…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-10-27 Hansjoerg Albrecher , Pierre-Olivier Goffard

Proof-of-Stake blockchains based on a longest-chain consensus protocol are an attractive energy-friendly alternative to the Proof-of-Work paradigm. However, formal barriers to "getting the incentives right" were recently discovered, driven…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2023-10-31 Matheus V. X. Ferreira , S. Matthew Weinberg

We present a novel framework for analyzing blockchain consensus mechanisms by modeling blockchain growth as a Partially Observable Stochastic Game (POSG) which we reduce to a set of Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs)…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2026-01-12 Yanni Georghiades , Takashi Tanaka , Sriram Vishwanath

Most PoW blockchain protocols operate with a simple mechanism whereby a threshold is set for each block and miners generate block hashes until one of those values falls below the threshold. Although largely effective, this mechanism…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-07-14 George Bissias

In a PoW-based blockchain network, mining pools (the solo miner could be regarded as a mining pool containing one miner) compete to successfully mine blocks to pursue rewards. Generally, the rewards include the fixed block subsidies and…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-10-20 Jinmian Chen , Yukun Cheng , Zhiqi Xu , Yan Cao

Selfish mining is a well known vulnerability in blockchains exploited by miners to steal block rewards. In this paper, we explore a new form of selfish mining attack that guarantees high rewards with low cost. We show the feasibility of…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-12-18 Muhammad Saad , Laurent Njilla , Charles Kamhoua , Aziz Mohaisen

This paper opts to mitigate the energy-inefficiency of the Blockchain Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus algorithm by rationally repurposing the power spent during the mining process. The original PoW mining scheme is designed to consider one…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2020-07-09 Noureddine Lasla , Lina Alsahan , Mohamed Abdallah , Mohamed Younis

In this paper, we review the undercutting attacks in the transaction-fee-based regime of proof-of-work (PoW) blockchains with the longest chain fork-choice rule. Next, we focus on the problem of fluctuations in mining revenue and the mining…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2023-02-13 Rastislav Budinský , Ivan Homoliak , Ivana Stančíková

This paper studies a fundamental problem regarding the security of blockchain on how the existence of multiple misbehaving pools influences the profitability of selfish mining. Each selfish miner maintains a private chain and makes it…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-11-21 Qianlan Bai , Xinyan Zhou , Xing Wang , Yuedong Xu , Xin Wang , Qingsheng Kong

Bitcoin mining is a wasteful and resource-intensive process. To add a block of transactions to the blockchain, miners spend a considerable amount of energy. The Bitcoin protocol, named 'proof of work' (PoW), resembles a lottery and the…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2020-01-28 Andrei Lihu , Jincheng Du , Igor Barjaktarevic , Patrick Gerzanics , Mark Harvilla

Mining blocks in a blockchain using the \textit{Proof-of-Work} consensus protocol involves significant risk, as network participants face continuous operational costs while earning infrequent capital gains upon successfully mining a block.…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2025-11-19 Pierre-Olivier Goffard , Hansjoerg Albrecher , Jean-Pierre Fouque

In cryptocurrencies, the block reward is meant to serve as the incentive mechanism for miners to commit resources to create blocks and in effect secure the system. Existing systems primarily divide the reward in proportion to expended…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2021-03-24 Lucianna Kiffer , Rajmohan Rajaraman

All public blockchains are secured by a proof of opportunity cost among block producers. For example, the security offered by proof-of-work (PoW) systems, like Bitcoin, is due to spent computation; it is work precisely because it cannot be…

Computer Science and Game Theory · Computer Science 2019-08-27 George Bissias , Brian N. Levine , David Thibodeau

Eyal and Sirer's selfish mining strategy has demonstrated that Bitcoin system is not secure even if 50% of total mining power is held by altruistic miners. Since then, researchers have been investigating either to improve the efficiency of…

Multiagent Systems · Computer Science 2018-02-08 Tin Leelavimolsilp , Long Tran-Thanh , Sebastian Stein

Proof of Work (PoW) has extensively served as the foundation of blockchain's security, consistency, and tamper-resistance. However, long has it been criticized for its tremendous and inefficient utilization of computational power and…

Distributed, Parallel, and Cluster Computing · Computer Science 2025-03-04 Weihang Cao , Xintong Ling , Jiaheng Wang , Xiqi Gao , Zhi Ding

Bitcoin is the first secure decentralized electronic currency system. However, it is known to be inefficient due to its proof-of-work (PoW) consensus algorithm and has the potential hazard of double spending. In this paper, we aim to reduce…

Cryptography and Security · Computer Science 2018-07-10 Chi-Ning Chou , Yu-Jing Lin , Ren Chen , Hsiu-Yao Chang , I-Ping Tu , Shih-wei Liao