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We present methods for online linear optimization that take advantage of benign (as opposed to worst-case) sequences. Specifically if the sequence encountered by the learner is described well by a known "predictable process", the algorithms…
Poker is a challenging problem for artificial intelligence, with non-deterministic dynamics, partial observability, and the added difficulty of unknown adversaries. Modelling all of the uncertainties in this domain is not an easy task. In…
Guided cooperation allows intelligent agents with heterogeneous capabilities to work together by following a leader-follower type of interaction. However, the associated control problem becomes challenging when the leader agent does not…
This paper investigates a class of multi-player discrete games where each player aims to maximize its own utility function. Each player does not know the other players' action sets, their deployed actions or the structures of its own or the…
While Artificial Intelligence has successfully outperformed humans in complex combinatorial games (such as chess and checkers), humans have retained their supremacy in social interactions that require intuition and adaptation, such as…
Optimization under uncertainty is a fundamental problem in learning and decision-making, particularly in multi-agent systems. Previously, Feldman, Kalai, and Tennenholtz [2010] demonstrated the ability to efficiently compete in repeated…
Poker is a family of card games that includes many variations. We hypothesize that most poker games can be solved as a pattern matching problem, and propose creating a strong poker playing system based on a unified poker representation. Our…
With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two…
In this paper, we consider a discrete-time stochastic Stackelberg game with a single leader and multiple followers. Both the followers and the leader together have conditionally independent private types, conditioned on action and previous…
We consider the problem of online learning where the sequence of actions played by the learner must adhere to an unknown safety constraint at every round. The goal is to minimize regret with respect to the best safe action in hindsight…
This paper examines multiplayer symmetric constant-sum games with more than two players in a competitive setting, including examples like Mahjong, Poker, and various board and video games. In contrast to two-player zero-sum games,…
Detection of malicious behavior is a fundamental problem in security. One of the major challenges in using detection systems in practice is in dealing with an overwhelming number of alerts that are triggered by normal behavior (the…
We study the problem of learning classifiers robust to universal adversarial perturbations. While prior work approaches this problem via robust optimization, adversarial training, or input transformation, we instead phrase it as a…
When deployed in the world, a learning agent such as a recommender system or a chatbot often repeatedly interacts with another learning agent (such as a user) over time. In many such two-agent systems, each agent learns separately and the…
A central capability of intelligent systems is the ability to continuously build upon previous experiences to speed up and enhance learning of new tasks. Two distinct research paradigms have studied this question. Meta-learning views this…
We propose a novel adversarial learning strategy for mixture models of Hawkes processes, leveraging data augmentation techniques of Hawkes process in the framework of self-paced learning. Instead of learning a mixture model directly from a…
We investigate the concept of algorithmic replicability introduced by Impagliazzo et al. 2022, Ghazi et al. 2021, Ahn et al. 2024 in an online setting. In our model, the input sequence received by the online learner is generated from…
Game theory provides essential analysis in many applications of strategic interactions. However, the question of how to construct a game model and what is its fidelity is seldom addressed. In this work, we consider learning in a class of…
Many learning algorithms are known to converge to an equilibrium for specific classes of games if the same learning algorithm is adopted by all agents. However, when the agents are self-interested, a natural question is whether agents have…
Individuals, or organizations, cooperate with or compete against one another in a wide range of practical situations. Such strategic interactions are often modeled as games played on networks, where an individual's payoff depends not only…