Related papers: Bribery and Control in Stable Marriage
Most of the computational study of election problems has assumed that each voter's preferences are, or should be extended to, a total order. However in practice voters may have preferences with ties. We study the complexity of manipulative…
We study the parameterized complexity of counting variants of Swap- and Shift-Bribery problems, focusing on the parameterizations by the number of swaps and the number of voters. We show experimentally that Swap-Bribery offers a new…
Control and manipulation are two of the most studied types of attacks on elections. In this paper, we study the complexity of control attacks on elections in which there are manipulators. We study both the case where the "chair" who is…
We study (coalitional) exchange stability, which Alcalde [Economic Design, 1995] introduced as an alternative solution concept for matching markets involving property rights, such as assigning persons to two-bed rooms. Here, a matching of a…
Integrity of elections is vital to democratic systems, but it is frequently threatened by malicious actors. The study of algorithmic complexity of the problem of manipulating election outcomes by changing its structural features is known as…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
Two-sided matching markets describe a large class of problems wherein participants from one side of the market must be matched to those from the other side according to their preferences. In many real-world applications (e.g. content…
For many voting rules, it is NP-hard to compute a successful manipulation. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. We study empirically…
Stable matching in a community consisting of men and women is a classical combinatorial problem that has been the subject of intense theoretical and empirical study since its introduction in 1962 in a seminal paper by Gale and Shapley, who…
The deferred acceptance algorithm is an elegant solution to the stable matching problem that guarantees optimality and truthfulness for one side of the market. Despite these desirable guarantees, it is susceptible to strategic misreporting…
We study the complexity of Destructive Shift Bribery. In this problem, we are given an election with a set of candidates and a set of voters (each ranking the candidates from the best to the worst), a despised candidate $d$, a budget $B$,…
A stable joint plan should guarantee the achievement of a designer's goal in a multi-agent environment, while ensuring that deviations from the prescribed plan would be detected. We present a computational framework where stable joint plans…
We study here several variants of the covariates fine balance problem where we generalize some of these problems and introduce a number of others. We present here a comprehensive complexity study of the covariates problems providing…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
Many-to-many matching with contracts is studied in the framework of revealed preferences. All preferences are described by choice functions that satisfy natural conditions. Under a no-externality assumption individual preferences can be…
In stable matching, one must find a matching between two sets of agents, commonly men and women, or job applicants and job positions. Each agent has a preference ordering over who they want to be matched with. Moreover a matching is said to…
A group of $n$ agents with numerical preferences for each other are to be assigned to the $n$ seats of a dining table. We study two natural topologies:~circular (cycle) tables and panel (path) tables. For a given seating arrangement, an…
Schulze and ranked-pairs elections have received much attention recently, and the former has quickly become a quite widely used election system. For many cases these systems have been proven resistant to bribery, control, or manipulation,…
In most real-world settings, due to limited time or other resources, an agent cannot perform all potentially useful deliberation and information gathering actions. This leads to the metareasoning problem of selecting such actions.…
Complexity theory is a useful tool to study computational issues surrounding the elicitation of preferences, as well as the strategic manipulation of elections aggregating together preferences of multiple agents. We study here the…