Related papers: Anonymous, non-manipulable, binary social choice
We investigate an averaging process that describes how interacting agents approach consensus through binary interactions. In each elementary step, two agents are selected at random and they reach compromise by adopting their opinion…
We investigate the implementation of reduced-form allocation probabilities in a two-person bargaining problem without side payments, where the agents have to select one alternative from a finite set of social alternatives. We provide a…
Eliciting a preference model involves asking a person, named decision-maker, a series of questions. We assume that these preferences can be represented by an additive value function. In this work, we query simultaneously two decision-makers…
Consider an arbitrary set $S$ and an arbitrary function $f : \mathbb{R} \to S$. We think of the domain of $f$ as representing time, and for each $x \in \mathbb{R}$, we think of $f(x)$ as the state of some system at time $x$. Imagine that,…
We axiomatically define a cardinal social inefficiency function, which, given a set of alternatives and individuals' vNM preferences over the alternatives, assigns a unique number -- the social inefficiency -- to each alternative. These…
We develop a framework that leverages the smoothed complexity analysis by Spielman and Teng to circumvent paradoxes and impossibility theorems in social choice, motivated by modern applications of social choice powered by AI and ML. For…
We consider the problem of designing truthful auctions, when the bidders' valuations have a public and a private component. In particular, we consider combinatorial auctions where the valuation of an agent $i$ for a set $S$ of items can be…
We study mechanism design for public-good provision under a noisy privacy-preserving transformation of individual agents' reported preferences. The setting is a standard binary model with transfers and quasi-linear utility. Agents report…
Let m>2 be an integer. We show that ZF + "For every integer n, Every countable family of non-empty sets of cardinality at most n has an infinite partial choice function" is not strong enough to prove that every countable set of m-element…
In most social choice settings, the participating agents express their preferences over the different alternatives in the form of linear orderings. While this clearly simplifies preference elicitation, it inevitably leads to poor…
We propose and study a stochastic binary opinion model where agents in a group are considered to hold an opinion of 0 or 1 at each moment. An agent in the group updates his/her opinion based on the group's opinion configuration and his/her…
We study a variation of the minority game. There are N agents. Each has to choose between one of two alternatives everyday, and there is reward to each member of the smaller group. The agents cannot communicate with each other, but try to…
We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the full social welfare using a discriminatory contract that…
We study the utilitarian distortion of social choice mechanisms under the recently proposed learning-augmented framework where some (possibly unreliable) predicted information about the preferences of the agents is given as input. In…
We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are selected, they may be incentivized to misrepresent their true…
A researcher observes a finite sequence of choices made by multiple agents in a binary-state environment. Agents maximize expected utilities that depend on their chosen alternative and the unknown underlying state. Agents learn about the…
Let A be a set of integers. For every integer n, let r_{A,h}(n) denote the number of representations of n in the form n = a_1 + a_2 + ... + a_h, where a_1, a_2,...,a_h are in A and a_1 \leq a_2 \leq ... \leq a_h. The function r_{A,h}: Z \to…
Impartial selection has recently received much attention within the multi-agent systems community. The task is, given a directed graph representing nominations to the members of a community by other members, to select the member with the…
Models of interacting social agents often represent agents as very simple entities having a small number of degrees of freedom, as exemplified by binary opinion models for instance. Understanding how such simple individual characteristics…
We consider the model of population protocols introduced by Angluin et al., in which anonymous finite-state agents stably compute a predicate of the multiset of their inputs via two-way interactions in the all-pairs family of communication…