Related papers: SCARE: Side Channel Attack on In-Memory Computing …
Performing data-intensive tasks in the von Neumann architecture is challenging to achieve both high performance and power efficiency due to the memory wall bottleneck. Computing-in-memory (CiM) is a promising mitigation approach by enabling…
Spin-Transfer Torque RAM (STTRAM) is promising for cache applications. However, it brings new data security issues that were absent in volatile memory counterparts such as Static RAM (SRAM) and embedded Dynamic RAM (eDRAM). This is…
Side-channel analysis (SCA) poses a real-world threat by exploiting unintentional physical signals to extract secret information from secure devices. Evaluation labs also use the same techniques to certify device security. In recent years,…
Compute in-memory (CIM) is a promising technique that minimizes data transport, the primary performance bottleneck and energy cost of most data intensive applications. This has found wide-spread adoption in accelerating neural networks for…
The side-channel attack is an attack method based on the information gained about implementations of computer systems, rather than weaknesses in algorithms. Information about system characteristics such as power consumption, electromagnetic…
Realizing today's cloud-level artificial intelligence functionalities directly on devices distributed at the edge of the internet calls for edge hardware capable of processing multiple modalities of sensory data (e.g. video, audio) at…
Side-channel attacks have empowered bypassing of cryptographic components in circuits. Power side-channel (PSC) attacks have received particular traction, owing to their non-invasiveness and proven effectiveness. Aside from prior art…
With the recent advancements in machine learning theory, many commercial embedded micro-processors use neural network models for a variety of signal processing applications. However, their associated side-channel security vulnerabilities…
Reading and writing memory are, besides computation, the most common operations a processor performs. The correctness of these operations is therefore essential for the proper execution of any program. However, as soon as fault attacks are…
With the advancement of technology in the last few decades, leading to the widespread availability of miniaturized sensors and internet-connected things (IoT), security of electronic devices has become a top priority. Side-channel attack…
Memory-unsafe programming languages such as C and C++ are the preferred languages for systems programming, embedded systems, and performance-critical applications. The widespread use of these languages makes the risk of memory-related…
Runahead execution is a technique to mask memory latency caused by irregular memory accesses. By pre-executing the application code during occurrences of long-latency operations and prefetching anticipated cache-missed data into the cache…
Artificial Intelligence (AI) hardware accelerators have been widely adopted to enhance the efficiency of deep learning applications. However, they also raise security concerns regarding their vulnerability to power side-channel attacks…
Physical side-channel attacks can compromise the security of integrated circuits. Most physical side-channel attacks (e.g., power or electromagnetic) exploit the dynamic behavior of a chip, typically manifesting as changes in current…
The RRAM-based neuromorphic computing system has amassed explosive interests for its superior data processing capability and energy efficiency than traditional architectures, and thus being widely used in many data-centric applications. The…
While general-purpose computing follows Von Neumann's architecture, the data movement between memory and processor elements dictates the processor's performance. The evolving compute-in-memory (CiM) paradigm tackles this issue by…
Control-Flow Hijacking attacks are the dominant attack vector against C/C++ programs. Control-Flow Integrity (CFI) solutions mitigate these attacks on the forward edge,i.e., indirect calls through function pointers and virtual calls.…
In-Memory Computing (IMC) introduces a new paradigm of computation that offers high efficiency in terms of latency and power consumption for AI accelerators. However, the non-idealities and defects of emerging technologies used in advanced…
Physical side channels emerge from the relation between internal computation or data with observable physical parameters of a chip. Previous works mostly focus on properties related to current consumption such as power consumption. The…
Traditionally, power side-channel analysis requires physical access to the target device, as well as specialized devices to measure the power consumption with enough precision. Recently research has shown that on x86 platforms, on-chip…