Related papers: SCARE: Side Channel Attack on In-Memory Computing …
Intellectual Property (IP) theft is a serious concern for the integrated circuit (IC) industry. To address this concern, logic locking countermeasure transforms a logic circuit to a different one to obfuscate its inner details. The…
Neural networks have become a fundamental component of numerous practical applications, and their implementations, which are often accelerated by hardware, are integrated into all types of real-world physical devices. User interactions with…
Self-modifying code (SMC) allows programs to alter their own instructions, optimizing performance and functionality on x86 processors. Despite its benefits, SMC introduces unique microarchitectural behaviors that can be exploited for…
In cloud computing environments, multiple tenants are often co-located on the same multi-processor system. Thus, preventing information leakage between tenants is crucial. While the hypervisor enforces software isolation, shared hardware,…
Processing-in-memory (PIM) turns out to be a promising solution to breakthrough the memory wall and the power wall. While prior PIM designs yield successful implementation of bitwise Boolean logic operations locally in memory, it is…
Side-channel attacks (SCAs), which infer secret information (for example secret keys) by exploiting information that leaks from the implementation (such as power consumption), have been shown to be a non-negligible threat to modern…
Integrated circuits (ICs) are essential to modern electronic systems, yet they face significant risks from physical reverse engineering (RE) attacks that compromise intellectual property (IP) and overall system security. While IC camouflage…
Side-channel attacks on microprocessors, like the RISC-V, exhibit security vulnerabilities that lead to several design challenges. Hence, it is imperative to study and analyze these security vulnerabilities comprehensively. In this paper,…
We propose a novel approach for performing side-channel attacks on elliptic curve cryptography. Unlike previous approaches and inspired by the ``activity detection'' literature, we adopt a long-short-term memory (LSTM) neural network to…
Edge AI inference is becoming prevalent thanks to the emergence of small yet high-performance microprocessors. This shift from cloud to edge processing brings several benefits in terms of energy savings, improved latency, and increased…
Embedded devices are increasingly present in our everyday life. They often process critical information, and hence, rely on cryptographic protocols to achieve security. However, embedded devices remain vulnerable to attackers seeking to…
Stochastic computing (SC) offers hardware simplicity but suffers from low throughput, while high-throughput Digital Computing-in-Memory (DCIM) is bottlenecked by costly adder logic for matrix-vector multiplication (MVM). To address this…
During the last decade, Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have progressively been integrated on all types of platforms, from data centers to embedded systems including low-power processors and, recently, FPGAs. Neural Networks (NN) are expected to…
Integrated circuit (IC) camouflaging is a promising technique to protect the design of a chip from reverse engineering. However, recent work has shown that even camouflaged ICs can be reverse engineered from the observed input/output…
Modern Systems-on-Chip (SoCs) employ undocumented linear address-scrambling functions to obfuscate DRAM addressing, which complicates DRAM-aware performance optimizations and hinders proactive security analysis of DRAM-based attacks; most…
Despite huge success of artificial intelligence, hardware systems running these algorithms consume orders of magnitude higher energy compared to the human brain, mainly due to heavy data movements between the memory unit and the computation…
The dependence of power-consumption on the processed data is a known vulnerability of CMOS circuits, resulting in side channels which can be exploited by power-based side channel attacks (SCAs). These attacks can extract sensitive…
Side-channel and fault injection attacks reveal secret information by monitoring or manipulating the physical effects of computations involving secret variables. Circuit-level countermeasures help to deter these attacks, and traditionally…
We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…
Rigorous quantitative evaluation of microarchitectural side channels is challenging for two reasons. First, the processors, attacks, and defenses often exhibit probabilistic behaviors. These probabilistic behaviors arise due to natural…