Related papers: A Hybrid Approach to Formal Verification of Higher…

Power side-channel attacks, which can deduce secret data via statistical analysis, have become a serious threat. Masking is an effective countermeasure for reducing the statistical dependence between secret data and side-channel…

Masking is a widely-used effective countermeasure against power side-channel attacks for implementing cryptographic algorithms. Surprisingly, few formal verification techniques have addressed a fundamental question, i.e., whether the masked…

Measuring the information leakage is critical for evaluating the practical security of cryptographic devices against side-channel analysis. Information-theoretic measures can be used (along with Fano's inequality) to derive upper bounds on…

Side channel attacks have emerged as a serious threat to the security of both networked and embedded systems -- in particular through the implementations of cryptographic operations. Side channels can be difficult to model formally, but…

Side-channel attacks extracting sensitive data from implementations have been considered a major threat to the security of cryptographic schemes. This has elevated the need for improved designs by embodying countermeasures, with masking…

Side-channel attacks are a major threat to the security of cryptosystems. Masking is a widely used countermeasure against such attacks, but proving the security of masked algorithms is error-prone without formal verification. In this work,…

Side-channel attacks impose a serious threat to cryptographic algorithms, including widely employed ones, such as AES and RSA. These attacks take advantage of the algorithm implementation in hardware or software to extract secret…

We present a kernel-level infrastructure that allows system-wide detection of malicious applications attempting to exploit cache-based side-channel attacks to break the process confinement enforced by standard operating systems. This…

In his keynote speech at CHES 2004, Kocher advocated that side-channel attacks were an illustration that formal cryptography was not as secure as it was believed because some assumptions (e.g., no auxiliary information is available during…

This paper considers a method of coding the sensor outputs in order to detect stealthy false data injection attacks. An intelligent attacker can design a sequence of data injection to sensors and actuators that pass the state estimator and…

Rigorous quantitative evaluation of microarchitectural side channels is challenging for two reasons. First, the processors, attacks, and defenses often exhibit probabilistic behaviors. These probabilistic behaviors arise due to natural…

Side-channel attacks have become a severe threat to the confidentiality of computer applications and systems. One popular type of such attacks is the microarchitectural attack, where the adversary exploits the hardware features to break the…

Although cryptographic algorithms may be mathematically secure, it is often possible to leak secret information from the implementation of the algorithms. Timing and power side-channel vulnerabilities are some of the most widely considered…

Acoustic side-channel attacks on keyboards can bypass security measures in many systems that use keyboards as one of the input devices. These attacks aim to reveal users' sensitive information by targeting the sounds made by their keyboards…

Recently, various side-channel attacks on widely used encryption methods have been discovered. Extensive research is currently undertaken to develop new types of combined encryption and authentication mechanisms. Developers of security…

Side Channel Analysis (SCA) presents a clear threat to privacy and security in modern computing systems. The vast majority of communications are secured through cryptographic algorithms. These algorithms are often provably-secure from a…

Numerous previous works have studied deep learning algorithms applied in the context of side-channel attacks, which demonstrated the ability to perform successful key recoveries. These studies show that modern cryptographic devices are…

As NIST is putting the final touches on the standardization of PQC (Post Quantum Cryptography) public key algorithms, it is a racing certainty that peskier cryptographic attacks undeterred by those new PQC algorithms will surface. Such a…

We systematize software side-channel attacks with a focus on vulnerabilities and countermeasures in the cryptographic implementations. Particularly, we survey past research literature to categorize vulnerable implementations, and identify…

Side-channel attacks that leak sensitive information through a computing device's interaction with its physical environment have proven to be a severe threat to devices' security, particularly when adversaries have unfettered physical…