Related papers: Extractive contest design
We propose new results for the existence and uniqueness of a general nonparametric and nonseparable competitive equilibrium with substitutes. These results ensure the invertibility of a general competitive system. The existing literature…
We consider spatial voting where candidates are located in the Euclidean $d$-dimensional space, and each voter ranks candidates based on their distance from the voter's ideal point. We explore the case where information about the location…
An elegant characterization of the complexity of constraint satisfaction problems has emerged in the form of the the algebraic dichotomy conjecture of [BKJ00]. Roughly speaking, the characterization asserts that a CSP {\Lambda} is tractable…
We study games with finitely many participants, each having finitely many choices. We consider the following categories of participants: (I) populations: sets of nonatomic agents, (II) atomic splittable players, (III) atomic non splittable…
In the contest design problem, there are $n$ strategic contestants, each of whom decides an effort level. A contest designer with a fixed budget must then design a mechanism that allocates a prize $p_i$ to the $i$-th rank based on the…
We study a strategic experimentation game with exponential bandits, in which experiment outcomes are private. The equilibrium amount of experimentation is always higher than in the benchmark case where experiment outcomes are publicly…
A crucial part of data analysis is the validation of the resulting estimators, in particular, if several competing estimators need to be compared. Whether an estimator can be objectively validated is not a trivial property. If there exists…
In the competing risks problem, an important role is played by the cumulative incidence function (CIF), whose value at time $t$ is the probability of failure by time $t$ from a particular type of failure in the presence of other risks. In…
A double auction game with an infinite number of buyers and sellers is introduced. All sellers posses one unit of a good, all buyers desire to buy one unit. Each seller and each buyer has a private valuation of the good. The distribution of…
Most familiar equilibrium concepts, such as Nash and correlated equilibrium, guarantee only that no single player can improve their utility by deviating unilaterally. They offer no guarantees against profitable coordinated deviations by…
Variable or value elimination in a constraint satisfaction problem (CSP) can be used in preprocessing or during search to reduce search space size. A variable elimination rule (value elimination rule) allows the polynomial-time…
The problem of dividing resources fairly occurs in many practical situations and is therefore an important topic of study in economics. In this paper, we investigate envy-free divisions in the setting where there are multiple players in…
We present a constructive proof of the existence of an equilibrium in a competitive economy with sequentially locally non-constant excess demand functions. And we will show that the existence of such an equilibrium implies Sperner's lemma.…
This paper considers some the existence and uniqueness of strong solutions of stochastic neutral functional differential equations. The conditions on the neutral functional relax those commonly used to establish the existence and uniqueness…
We view voting rules as classifiers that assign a winner (a class) to a profile of voters' preferences (an instance). We propose to apply techniques from formal explainability, most notably abductive and contrastive explanations, to…
This paper presents a synthesis of the theories of portfolio generating functions and option pricing. The theory of portfolio generation is extended to measure the value of portfolios generated by positive C^{2,1} functions of asset prices…
The Adjusted Winner (AW) method is a fundamental procedure for the fair division of indivisible resources between two agents. However, its reliance on splitting resources can lead to practical complications. To address this limitation, we…
In lowest unique bid auctions, $N$ players bid for an item. The winner is whoever places the \emph{lowest} bid, provided that it is also unique. We use a grand canonical approach to derive an analytical expression for the equilibrium…
It has been assumed that arbitrage profits are not possible in efficient markets, because future prices are not predictable. Here we show that predictability alone is not a sufficient measure of market efficiency. We instead propose to…
We introduce convex function intervals (CFIs): families of convex functions satisfying given level and slope constraints. CFIs naturally arise as constraint sets in economic design, including problems with type-dependent participation…