Related papers: Extractive contest design
A property, or statistical functional, is said to be elicitable if it minimizes expected loss for some loss function. The study of which properties are elicitable sheds light on the capabilities and limitations of point estimation and…
We study the fundamental problem of fairly dividing a set of indivisible items among agents with (general) monotone valuations. The notion of envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) is considered to be one of the most fascinating fairness…
Agents exert hidden effort to produce randomly-sized innovations in a technology they share. Flow payoffs grow as the technology develops, but so does the marginal cost of effort. I characterise the unique symmetric MPE with the quality of…
Envy-freeness is one of the most widely studied notions in fair division. Since envy-free allocations do not always exist when items are indivisible, several relaxations have been considered. Among them, possibly the most compelling concept…
A general achievable upper bound of extractable work under feedback control is given, where nonequilibrium equalities are generalized so as to be applicable to error-free measurements. The upper bound involves a term which arises from the…
Selective rationalization has become a common mechanism to ensure that predictive models reveal how they use any available features. The selection may be soft or hard, and identifies a subset of input features relevant for prediction. The…
Chinese auctions are a combination between a raffle and an auction and are held in practice at charity events or festivals. In a Chinese auction, multiple players compete for several items by buying tickets, which can be used to win the…
We obtain sufficient conditions for an exponential type entire function not to have zeros in the open lower half-plane. An exact inequality containing the real and imaginary parts of such functions and their derivatives restricted to the…
We design and analyze attention games that incentivize validators to check computation results. We show that no pure strategy Nash equilibrium of the game without outside parties exists by a simple argument. We then proceed to calculate the…
This publication reviews the framework of abstract competition, which is aimed at studying complex systems with competition in their generic form. Although the concept of abstract competition has been derived from a specific field -…
We consider a fair division model in which agents have general valuations for bundles of indivisible items. We propose two new axiomatic properties for allocations in this model: EF1+- and EFX+-. We compare these with the existing EF1 and…
In the work the fair division problem for two participants in presence of both divisible and indivisible items is considered. The set of all divisions is formally described; it is demonstrated that fair (in terms of Brams and Taylor)…
We study a general scenario of simultaneous contests that allocate prizes based on equal sharing: each contest awards its prize to all players who satisfy some contest-specific criterion, and the value of this prize to a winner decreases as…
We consider active learning under incentive compatibility constraints. The main application of our results is to economic experiments, in which a learner seeks to infer the parameters of a subject's preferences: for example their attitudes…
We study incentive design when multiple principals simultaneously design mechanisms for their respective teams in environments with strategic spillovers. In this environment, each principal's set of incentive-compatible mechanisms--those…
The problem of estimating the proportion of satisfiable instances of a given CSP (constraint satisfaction problem) can be tackled through weighting. It consists in putting onto each solution a non-negative real value based on its…
In this paper, we study sequential auctions with two budget constrained bidders and any number of identical items. All prior results on such auctions consider only two items. We construct a canonical outcome of the auction that is the only…
We study the problem of determining an envy-free allocation of indivisible goods among multiple agents with additive valuations. EFX, which stands for envy-freeness up to any good, is a well-studied relaxation of the envy-free allocation…
One of the most important topics in discrete fair division is whether an EFX allocation exists for any instance. Although the existence of EFX allocations is a standing open problem for both goods and chores, the understanding of the…
Hidden variable graphical models can sometimes imply constraints on the observable distribution that are more complex than simple conditional independence relations. These observable constraints can falsify assumptions of the model that…