Related papers: Dynamic information design
This paper considers two investors who perform mean-variance portfolio selection with asymmetric information: one knows the true stock dynamics, while the other has to infer the true dynamics from observed stock evolution. Their portfolio…
This paper is devoted to a high-dimensional mixed leadership stochastic differential game on a finite horizon in feedback information mode, where the control variables enter into the diffusion term of state equation. A verification theorem…
We add the assumption that players know their opponents' payoff functions and rationality to a model of non-equilibrium learning in signaling games. Agents are born into player roles and play against random opponents every period.…
Strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) is the standard solution concept of Stackelberg security games. As opposed to the weak Stackelberg equilibrium (WSE), the SSE assumes that the follower breaks ties in favor of the leader and this is…
This paper considers the problem of how to allocate power among competing users sharing a frequency-selective interference channel. We model the interaction between selfish users as a non-cooperative game. As opposed to the existing…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
In this work, we study the system of interacting non-cooperative two Q-learning agents, where one agent has the privilege of observing the other's actions. We show that this information asymmetry can lead to a stable outcome of population…
An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…
We analyze the random sequential dynamics of a message passing algorithm for Ising models with random interactions in the large system limit. We derive exact results for the two-time correlation functions and the speed of convergence. The…
We discuss an open-loop backward Stackelberg differential game involving single leader and single follower. Unlike most Stackelberg game literature, the state to be controlled is characterized by a backward stochastic differential equation…
Existing methods for learning Stackelberg equilibria typically assume that the followers' (variational, generalized) Nash equilibrium is unique. However, in the presence of multiple equilibria, without a selection convention, the problem…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
Information design in an incomplete information game includes a designer with the goal of influencing players' actions through signals generated from a designed probability distribution so that its objective function is optimized. We…
Modeling the interaction between traffic agents is a key issue in designing safe and non-conservative maneuvers in autonomous driving. This problem can be challenging when multi-modality and behavioral uncertainties are engaged. Existing…
Many real-world games suffer from information asymmetry: one player is only aware of their own payoffs while the other player has the full game information. Examples include the critical domain of security games and adversarial multi-agent…
This paper is concerned with a linear-quadratic partially observed Stackelberg stochastic differential game with correlated state and observation noises, where the diffusion coefficient does not contain the control variable and the control…
The multilevel reverse Stackelberg game is considered. In this game, the leader controls the outcome by announcing a strategy as a function of decision variables of the followers to his/her own decision space. Corresponding to the leader's…
We consider a wireless communication system in which $N$ transmitter-receiver pairs want to communicate with each other. Each transmitter transmits data at a certain rate using a power that depends on the channel gain to its receiver. If a…
We continue the recent line of research studying information dissemination problems in adversarial dynamic radio networks. We give two generic algorithms which allow to transform generalized version of single-message broadcast algorithms…
We study how a decision-maker can acquire more information from an agent by reducing her own ability to observe what the agent transmits. In a large class of binary-action games, opacity design is just as good as full commitment to actions…