Related papers: Framing Effects on Strategic Information Design un…

Motivated by information sharing in online platforms, we study repeated persuasion between a sender and a stream of receivers where at each time, the sender observes a payoff-relevant state drawn independently and identically from an…

In recent studies of political decision-making, apparently anomalous behavior has been observed on the part of voters, in which negative information about a candidate strengthens, rather than weakens, a prior positive opinion about the…

Information-theoretic arguments focus on modeling the reliability of information transmission, assuming availability of infinite data at sources, thus ignoring randomness in message generation times at the respective sources. However, in…

We study how coordinated disinformation campaigns affect elections. We develop a constrained information design model in which a sender deploys uninformative messages that mimic voters' exogenous informative signals. Voters initially…

In Bayesian persuasion, an informed sender strategically discloses information to a receiver so as to persuade them to undertake desirable actions. Recently, a growing attention has been devoted to settings in which sender and receivers…

We analyse a communication scenario over a particular causal broadcast channel whose state depends on a modulo sum. The receivers of the broadcast receive channel state information and collaborate to determine the channel state as to decode…

In this work, we investigate a steering problem in a mediator-augmented two-player normal-form game, where the mediator aims to guide players toward a specific action profile through information and incentive design. We first characterize…

A game-theoretic model for analysing the effects of privacy on strategic communication between agents is devised. In the model, a sender wishes to provide an accurate measurement of the state to a receiver while also protecting its private…

Existing deep learning-enabled semantic communication systems often rely on shared background knowledge between the transmitter and receiver that includes empirical data and their associated semantic information. In practice, the semantic…

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information…

We consider a finite-horizon discrete-time dynamic system jointly controlled by a designer and one or more agents, where the designer can influence the agents' actions through selective information disclosure. At each time step, the…

A communication setup is considered where a transmitter wishes to simultaneously sense its channel state and convey a message to a receiver. The state is estimated at the transmitter by means of generalized feedback, i.e. a strictly causal…

Receivers in standard signaling game models struggle with learning compositional information. Even when the signalers send compositional messages, the receivers do not interpret them compositionally. When information from one message…

We consider scheduled message communication over a discrete memoryless degraded broadcast channel. The framework we consider here models both the random message arrivals and the subsequent reliable communication by suitably combining…

Semantic communication aims to convey meaning rather than bit-perfect reproduction, representing a paradigm shift from traditional communication. This paper investigates distribution learning in semantic communication where receivers must…

A sender communicates private information about a hidden state to a receiver who seeks to match his action to that state. The sender strives to appear informed at the receiver's expense. I characterize informative equilibria under a broad…

Quantum guessing games offer a structured approach to analyzing quantum information processing, where information is encoded in quantum states and extracted through measurement. An additional aspect of this framework is the influence of…

We study the strategic aspects of social influence in a society of agents linked by a trust network, introducing a new class of games called games of influence. A game of influence is an infinite repeated game with incomplete information in…

In bipartite matching problems, agents on two sides of a graph want to be paired according to their preferences. The stability of a matching depends on these preferences, which in uncertain environments also reflect agents' beliefs about…

This paper concerns sequential hypothesis testing in competitive multi-agent systems where agents exchange potentially manipulated information. Specifically, a two-agent scenario is studied where each agent aims to correctly infer the true…