Related papers: Framing Effects on Strategic Information Design un…

This paper analyzes the information disclosure problems originated in economics through the lens of information theory. Such problems are radically different from the conventional communication paradigms in information theory since they…

We study the consequences of information asymmetries and misaligned incentives in settings with multiple independent agents. We model an interaction between a Sender, who holds vital private information but cannot act, and a Receiver, who…

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for \emph{information acquisition} scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed \emph{receiver} and a set of informed \emph{senders}. In our model the senders…

Motivated by recent works in the communication and psychology literature, we model and study the role social identity -- a person's sense of belonging to a group -- plays in human information consumption. A hallmark of Social Identity…

This paper studies the role of hard information in contractual and market settings in which the receiver can flexibly adjust allocations and transfers in response to the sender's disclosure. These settings include monopoly pricing,…

We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted posterior in our model can be written as a convex…

We study online Bayesian persuasion problems in which an informed sender repeatedly faces a receiver with the goal of influencing their behavior through the provision of payoff-relevant information. Previous works assume that the sender has…

We consider a two-player dynamic information design problem between a principal and a receiver -- a game is played between the two agents on top of a Markovian system controlled by the receiver's actions, where the principal obtains and…

In this paper we describe a decision process framework allowing an agent to decide what information it should reveal to its neighbours within a communication graph in order to maximise its utility. We assume that these neighbours can pass…

Bayesian persuasion, a central model in information design, studies how a sender, who privately observes a state drawn from a prior distribution, strategically sends a signal to influence a receiver's action. A key assumption is that both…

We introduce a model of estimation in the presence of strategic, self-interested sensors. We employ a game-theoretic setup to model the interaction between the sensors and the receiver. The cost function of the receiver is equal to the…

We consider a sender-receiver game with an outside option for the sender. After the cheap talk phase, the receiver makes a proposal to the sender, which the latter can reject. We study situations in which the sender's approval is crucial to…

An uninformed sender publicly commits to an informative experiment about an uncertain state, privately observes its outcome, and sends a cheap-talk message to a receiver. We provide an algorithm valid for arbitrary state-dependent…

Information asymmetry in games enables players with the information advantage to manipulate others' beliefs by strategically revealing information to other players. This work considers a double-sided information asymmetry in a Bayesian…

A sender with state-independent preferences (i.e., transparent motives) privately observes a signal about the state of the world before sending a message to a receiver, who subsequently takes an action. Regardless of whether the receiver…

Reinforcement learning (RL) is inspired by the way human infants and animals learn from the environment. The setting is somewhat idealized because, in actual tasks, other agents in the environment have their own goals and behave adaptively…

This work considers a novel information design problem and studies how the craft of payoff-relevant environmental signals solely can influence the behaviors of intelligent agents. The agents' strategic interactions are captured by an…

Machine learning systems have been widely used to make decisions about individuals who may behave strategically to receive favorable outcomes, e.g., they may genuinely improve the true labels or manipulate observable features directly to…

We study optimal information provision in transportation networks when users are strategic and the network state is uncertain. An omniscient planner observes the network state and discloses information to the users with the goal of…

A game is introduced to study the effect of privacy in strategic communication between well-informed senders and a receiver. The receiver wants to accurately estimate a random variable. The sender, however, wants to communicate a message…