Related papers: Dissipativity Tools for Convergence to Nash Equili…
In this paper, we examine the long-run behavior of regularized, no-regret learning in finite games. A well-known result in the field states that the empirical frequencies of no-regret play converge to the game's set of coarse correlated…
The paper presents a model of two-speed evolution in which the payoffs in the population game (or, alternatively, the individual preferences) slowly adjust to changes in the aggregate behavior of the population. The model investigates how,…
In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…
This paper investigates the design of optimal strategy revision in Population Games (PG) by establishing its connection to finite-state Mean Field Games (MFG). Specifically, by linking Evolutionary Dynamics (ED) -- which models agent…
Many socio-economic and biological processes can be modeled as systems of interacting individuals. The behaviour of such systems can be often described within game-theoretic models. In these lecture notes, we introduce fundamental concepts…
Evolutionary competition often occurs simultaneously at multiple levels of organization, in which traits or behaviors that are costly for an individual can provide collective benefits to groups to which the individual belongs. Building off…
We consider a network of coupled agents playing the Prisoner's Dilemma game, in which players are allowed to pick a strategy in the interval [0,1], with 0 corresponding to defection, 1 to cooperation, and intermediate values representing…
The aim of this paper is to formulate and study a stochastic model for the management of environmental assets in a geographical context where in each place the local authorities take their policy decisions maximizing their own welfare,…
In this paper, we study Nash equilibrium payoffs for nonzero-sum stochastic differential games via the theory of backward stochastic differential equations. We obtain an existence theorem and a characterization theorem of Nash equilibrium…
In this paper, we propose a passivity-based methodology for analysis and design of reinforcement learning in multi-agent finite games. Starting from a known exponentially-discounted reinforcement learning scheme, we show that convergence to…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
We address the Nash equilibrium problem in a partial-decision information scenario, where each agent can only observe the actions of some neighbors, while its cost possibly depends on the strategies of other agents. Our main contribution is…
We consider a one-sided assignment market or exchange network with transferable utility and propose a model for the dynamics of bargaining in such a market. Our dynamical model is local, involving iterative updates of 'offers' based on…
Population games can be regarded as a tool to study the strategic interaction of a population of players. Although several attention has been given to such field, most of the available works have focused only on the unconstrained case. That…
This paper aims at investigating the problem of fast convergence to the Nash equilibrium (NE) for N-Player noncooperative differential games. The proposed method is such that the players attain their NE point without steady-state…
Bargaining networks model the behavior of a set of players that need to reach pairwise agreements for making profits. Nash bargaining solutions are special outcomes of such games that are both stable and balanced. Kleinberg and Tardos…
This paper studies a class of strongly monotone games involving non-cooperative agents that optimize their own time-varying cost functions. We assume that the agents can observe other agents' historical actions and choose actions that best…
We consider a subclass of $n$-player stochastic games, in which players have their own internal state/action spaces while they are coupled through their payoff functions. It is assumed that players' internal chains are driven by independent…
Distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of aggregative games is investigated and a continuous-time algorithm is proposed. The algorithm is designed by virtue of projected gradient play dynamics and distributed average tracking dynamics, and is…
In practical applications, decision-makers with heterogeneous dynamics may be engaged in the same decision-making process. This motivates us to study distributed Nash equilibrium seeking for games in which players are mixed-order (first-…