Related papers: Stable Roommate Problem with Diversity Preferences
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either impossible to achieve or can come at the cost of leaving many agents…
The class of assignment problems is a fundamental and well-studied class in the intersection of Social Choice, Computational Economics and Discrete Allocation. In a general assignment problem, a group of agents expresses preferences over a…
We study fairness in house allocation, where $m$ houses are to be allocated among $n$ agents so that every agent receives one house. We show that maximizing the number of envy-free agents is hard to approximate to within a factor of…
We propose two solution concepts for matchings under preferences: robustness and near stability. The former strengthens while the latter relaxes the classic definition of stability by Gale and Shapley (1962). Informally speaking, robustness…
While every instance of the Hospitals/Residents problem admits a stable matching, the problem with lower quotas (HR-LQ) has instances with no stable matching. For such an instance, we expect the existence of an envy-free matching, which is…
In the Hospitals/Residents problem, every hospital has an upper quota that limits the number of residents assigned to it. While, in some applications, each hospital also has a lower quota for the number of residents it receives. In this…
In two-sided matching markets, the agents are partitioned into two sets. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if there are no blocking…
We study the stable marriage problem in two-sided markets with randomly generated preferences. We consider agents on each side divided into a constant number of "soft tiers", which intuitively indicate the quality of the agent.…
The Hospital Residents problem with sizes (HRS) is a generalization of the well-studied hospital residents (HR) problem. In the HRS problem, an agent $a$ has a size $s(a)$ and the agent occupies $s(a)$ many positions of the hospital $h$…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
We study a variant of the Student-Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students where ties are allowed in the preference lists of students and lecturers (SPA-ST). We investigate the concept of strong stability in this…
In the Hospitals/Residents (HR) problem, agents are partitioned into hospitals and residents. Each agent wishes to be matched to an agent in the other set and has a strict preference over these potential matches. A matching is stable if…
This paper gives an overview on and summarizes existing complexity and algorithmic results of some variants of the Stable Marriage and the Stable Roommates problems. The last section defines a list of stable matching problems mentioned in…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
We consider a classic many-to-one matching setting, where participants need to be assigned to teams based on the preferences of both sides. Unlike most of the matching literature, we aim to provide fairness not only to participants, but…
We study a decision-maker's problem of finding optimal monetary incentive schemes for retention when faced with agents whose participation decisions (stochastically) depend on the incentive they receive. Our focus is on policies constrained…
There are growing concerns that algorithms, which increasingly make or influence important decisions pertaining to individuals, might produce outcomes that discriminate against protected groups. We study such fairness concerns in the…
We initiate the study of matching roommates and rooms wherein the preferences of agents over other agents and rooms are complementary and represented by Leontief utilities. In this setting, 2n agents must be paired up and assigned to n…
In several two-sided markets, including labor and dating, agents typically have limited information about their preferences prior to mutual interactions. This issue can result in matching frictions, as arising in the labor market for…
Inspired by the recent COVID-19 pandemic, we study a generalization of the multi-resource allocation problem with heterogeneous demands and Leontief utilities. Unlike existing settings, we allow each agent to specify requirements to only…