Related papers: The Adversarial Stackelberg Value in Quantitative …

This paper analyzes a class of Stackelberg games where different actors compete for shared resources and a central authority tries to balance the demand through a pricing mechanism. Situations like this can for instance occur when fleet…

From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We define a two-player…

Quantitative games are two-player zero-sum games played on directed weighted graphs. Total-payoff games (that can be seen as a refinement of the well-studied mean-payoff games) are the variant where the payoff of a play is computed as the…

Optimizing strategic decisions (a.k.a. computing equilibrium) is key to the success of many non-cooperative multi-agent applications. However, in many real-world situations, we may face the exact opposite of this game-theoretic problem --…

We study Stackelberg equilibria in finitely repeated games, where the leader commits to a strategy that picks actions in each round and can be adaptive to the history of play (i.e. they commit to an algorithm). In particular, we study…

We investigate zero-sum turn-based two-player stochastic games in which the objective of one player is to maximize the amount of rewards obtained during a play, while the other aims at minimizing it. We focus on games in which the minimizer…

We study two-player zero-sum repeated games with incomplete information on one side, where the payoff function is tail measurable (and not necessarily the long-run average payoff). We show that the maxmin value equals the concavification of…

We consider two-player games played on weighted directed graphs with mean-payoff and total-payoff objectives, two classical quantitative objectives. While for single-dimensional games the complexity and memory bounds for both objectives…

We introduce a zero-sum game problem of mean-field type as an extension of the classical zero-sum Dynkin game problem to the case where the payoff processes might depend on the value of the game and its probability law. We establish…

Suppose a Bayesian agent seeks to traverse a graph. Each time she crosses an edge, she pays a price. The first time she reaches a node, there is a payoff. She has an opponent who can reduce the payoffs. This paper uses adversarial risk…

Principal-agent problems arise when one party acts on behalf of another, leading to conflicts of interest. The economic literature has extensively studied principal-agent problems, and recent work has extended this to more complex scenarios…

Semi-Markov model is one of the most general models for stochastic dynamic systems. This paper deals with a two-person zero-sum game for semi-Markov processes. We focus on the expected discounted payoff criterion with state-action-dependent…

Using methods from the statistical mechanics of disordered systems we analyze the properties of bimatrix games with random payoffs in the limit where the number of pure strategies of each player tends to infinity. We analytically calculate…

We study the computational complexity of finding Stackelberg Equilibria in general-sum games, where the set of pure strategies of the leader and the followers are exponentially large in a natrual representation of the problem. In…

We introduce the application of online learning in a Stackelberg game pertaining to a system with two learning agents in a dyadic exchange network, consisting of a supplier and retailer, specifically where the parameters of the demand…

Dynamic Stackelberg games are a broad class of two-player games in which the leader acts first, and the follower chooses a response strategy to the leader's strategy. Unfortunately, only stylized Stackelberg games are explicitly solvable…

For two-person dynamic zero-sum games (both discrete and continuous settings), we investigate the limit of value functions of finite horizon games with long run average cost as the time horizon tends to infinity and the limit of value…

This paper focuses on the performance of equalizer zero-determinant (ZD) strategies in discounted repeated Stackerberg asymmetric games. In the leader-follower adversarial scenario, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) deriving from the…

We consider concurrent games played by two-players on a finite-state graph, where in every round the players simultaneously choose a move, and the current state along with the joint moves determine the successor state. We study a…

In a mean-payoff parity game, one of the two players aims both to achieve a qualitative parity objective and to minimize a quantitative long-term average of payoffs (aka. mean payoff). The game is zero-sum and hence the aim of the other…