Related papers: AiR-ViBeR: Exfiltrating Data from Air-Gapped Compu…
In this paper we show how attackers can covertly leak data (e.g., encryption keys, passwords and files) from highly secure or air-gapped networks via the row of status LEDs that exists in networking equipment such as LAN switches and…
Highly secure devices are often isolated from the Internet or other public networks due to the confidential information they process. This level of isolation is referred to as an 'air-gap .' In this paper, we present a new technique named…
Covert channel attacks have been continuously studied as severe threats to modern computing systems. Software-based covert channels are a typically hard-to-detect branch of these attacks, since they leverage virtual resources to establish…
In recent years, various out-of-band covert channels have been proposed that demonstrate the feasibility of leaking data out of computers without the need for network connectivity. The methods proposed have been based on different type of…
Air-gapped systems are considered highly secure against data leaks due to their physical isolation from external networks. Despite this protection, ultrasonic communication has been demonstrated as an effective method for exfiltrating data…
Covert channel networks are a well-known method for circumventing the security measures organizations put in place to protect their networks from adversarial attacks. This paper introduces a novel method based on bit-rate modulation for…
Investigating network covert channels in smartphones has become increasingly important as smartphones have recently replaced the role of traditional computers. Smartphones are subject to traditional computer network covert channel…
Physical isolation, so called air-gapping, is an effective method for protecting security-critical computers and networks. While it might be possible to introduce malicious code through the supply chain, insider attacks, or social…
In recent years researchers have demonstrated how attackers could use USB connectors implanted with RF transmitters to exfiltrate data from secure, and even air-gapped, computers (e.g., COTTONMOUTH in the leaked NSA ANT catalog). Such…
In this paper we present a method which allows attackers to covertly leak data from isolated, air-gapped computers. Our method utilizes the hard disk drive (HDD) activity LED which exists in most of today's desktop PCs, laptops and servers.…
Using the keyboard LEDs to send data optically was proposed in 2002 by Loughry and Umphress [1] (Appendix A). In this paper we extensively explore this threat in the context of a modern cyber-attack with current hardware and optical…
Modern optical mouse sensors, with their advanced precision and high responsiveness, possess an often overlooked vulnerability: they can be exploited for side-channel attacks. This paper introduces Mic-E-Mouse, the first-ever side-channel…
Music is an expression of our identity, showing a significant correlation with other personal traits, beliefs, and habits. If accessed by a malicious entity, an individual's music listening habits could be used to make critical inferences…
As smartphones become more pervasive, they are increasingly targeted by malware. At the same time, each new generation of smartphone features increasingly powerful onboard sensor suites. A new strain of sensor malware has been developing…
Personal data has become one of the most valuable assets and lucrative targets for attackers in the modern digital world. This includes personal identification information (PII), medical records, legal information, biometric data, and…
New security and privacy concerns arise due to the growing popularity of voice assistant (VA) deployments in home and enterprise networks. A number of past research results have demonstrated how malicious actors can use hidden commands to…
Vibrometry-based side channels pose a significant privacy risk, exploiting sensors like mmWave radars, light sensors, and accelerometers to detect vibrations from sound sources or proximate objects, enabling speech eavesdropping. Despite…
In this paper we show how two (or more) airgapped computers in the same room, equipped with passive speakers, headphones, or earphones can covertly exchange data via ultrasonic waves. Microphones are not required. Our method is based on the…
Air-gapped computers are computers which are kept isolated from the Internet, because they store and process sensitive information. When highly sensitive data is involved, an air-gapped computer might also be kept secluded in a Faraday…
We present the first acoustic side-channel attack that recovers what users type on the virtual keyboard of their touch-screen smartphone or tablet. When a user taps the screen with a finger, the tap generates a sound wave that propagates on…