Related papers: Hardware Trojan Detection Using Controlled Circuit…
We introduce a new class of hardware trojans called interrupt-resilient trojans (IRTs). Our work is motivated by the observation that hardware trojan attacks on CPUs, even under favorable attack scenarios (e.g., an attacker with local…
Despite their success and popularity, deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable when facing backdoor attacks. This impedes their wider adoption, especially in mission critical applications. This paper tackles the problem of Trojan…
To reduce the cost of ICs and to meet the market's demand, a considerable portion of manufacturing supply chain, including silicon fabrication, packaging and testing may be pushed offshore. Utilizing a global IC manufacturing supply chain,…
Detection of level shifts in a noisy signal, or trend break detection, is a problem that appears in several research fields, from biophysics to optics and economics. Although many algorithms have been developed to deal with such problem,…
Security is an important facet of integrated circuit design for many applications. IP privacy and Trojan insertion are growing threats as circuit fabrication in advanced nodes almost inevitably relies on untrusted foundries. A proposed…
With current tools and technology, someone who has physical access to a chip can extract the detailed layout of the integrated circuit (IC). By using advanced visual imaging techniques, reverse engineering can reveal details that are meant…
The transistors used to construct Integrated Circuits (ICs) continue to shrink. While this shrinkage improves performance and density, it also reduces trust: the price to build leading-edge fabrication facilities has skyrocketed, forcing…
This report investigates the potential impact of a Trojan attack on power conversion circuits, specifically a switching signal attack designed to trigger a locking of the pulse width modulation (PWM) signal that goes to a power field-effect…
Hardware Trojans are malicious modifications in digital designs that can be inserted by untrusted supply chain entities. Hardware Trojans can give rise to diverse attack vectors such as information leakage (e.g. MOLES Trojan) and…
The growing complexity of global supply chains has made hardware Trojans a significant threat in sensor-based power electronics. Traditional Trojan designs depend on digital triggers or fixed threshold conditions that can be detected during…
A globally distributed IC supply chain brings risks due to untrusted third parties. The risks span inadvertent use of hardware Trojan (HT), inserted Intellectual Property (3P-IP) or Electronic Design Automation (EDA) flows. HT can introduce…
A detection system, modeled in a graph, uses "detectors" on a subset of vertices to uniquely identify an "intruder" at any vertex. We consider two types of detection systems: open-locating-dominating (OLD) sets and identifying codes (ICs).…
A trojan backdoor is a hidden pattern typically implanted in a deep neural network. It could be activated and thus forces that infected model behaving abnormally only when an input data sample with a particular trigger present is fed to…
The recent surge in hardware security is significant due to offshoring the proprietary Intellectual property (IP). One distinct dimension of the disruptive threat is malicious logic insertion, also known as Hardware Trojan (HT). HT subverts…
Deep neural networks are known to have security issues. One particular threat is the Trojan attack. It occurs when the attackers stealthily manipulate the model's behavior through Trojaned training samples, which can later be exploited.…
The pivotal issue of reliability is one of colossal concern for circuit designers. The driving force is transistor aging, dependent on operating voltage and workload. At the design time, it is difficult to estimate close-to-the-edge…
Silent Errors within hardware devices occur when an internal defect manifests in a part of the circuit which does not have check logic to detect the incorrect circuit operation. The results of such a defect can range from flipping a single…
Split manufacturing (SM) and layout camouflaging (LC) are two promising techniques to obscure integrated circuits (ICs) from malicious entities during and after manufacturing. While both techniques enable protecting the intellectual…
The increasing cost of integrated circuit (IC) fabrication has driven most companies to "go fabless" over time. The corresponding outsourcing trend gave rise to various attack vectors, e.g., illegal overproduction of ICs, piracy of the…
While neural networks demonstrate stronger capabilities in pattern recognition nowadays, they are also becoming larger and deeper. As a result, the effort needed to train a network also increases dramatically. In many cases, it is more…