Related papers: On the Structure of Stable Tournament Solutions
A well known result states that stability criterion for matchings in two-sided markets doesn't ensure uniqueness. This opens the door for a moral question with regard to the optimal stable matching from a social point of view. Here, a new…
Fair classification has been a topic of intense study in machine learning, and several algorithms have been proposed towards this important task. However, in a recent study, Friedler et al. observed that fair classification algorithms may…
The recently introduced continuous Hopfield network (see Ramsauer et al.) exhibits large memorization capabilities, which manifest as attractive fixed points of its update rule -- a differentiable function consisting of two linear mappings…
Motivated by data on coauthorships in scientific publications, we analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different…
Multidimensional persistence studies topological features of shapes by analyzing the lower level sets of vector-valued functions. The rank invariant completely determines the multidimensional analogue of persistent homology groups. We prove…
Stability Selection was recently introduced by Meinshausen and Buhlmann (2010) as a very general technique designed to improve the performance of a variable selection algorithm. It is based on aggregating the results of applying a selection…
We show that if $D$ is a tournament of arbitrary size then $D$ has finite strong components after reversing a locally finite sequence of cycles. In turn, we prove that any tournament can be covered by two acyclic sets after reversing a…
We generalize several schedule matching theorems of Baiou-Balinski (Math. Oper. Res., 27 (2002), 485) and Alkan-Gale (J. Econ. Th. 112 (2003), 289) by applying a fixed point method of Fleiner (Math. Oper. Res., 28 (2003), 103). Thanks to a…
A probabilistic approach to the stable matching problem has been identified as an important research area with several important open problems. When considering random matchings, ex-post stability is a fundamental stability concept. A…
The dynamical behavior of switched affine systems is known to be more intricate than that of the well-studied switched linear systems, essentially due to the existence of distinct equilibrium points for each subsystem. First, under…
We analyse a coalition formation game between strategic service providers of a congestible service. The key novelty of our formulation is that it is a constant sum game, i.e., the total payoff across all service providers (or coalitions of…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
The stability of stationary solutions of first-order systems of PDE's are considered. They may include some singular geometric terms, leading to discontinuous flux and non-conservative products. Based on several examples in Fluid Mechanics,…
We introduce new sufficient conditions for verifying stability and recurrence properties in singularly perturbed stochastic hybrid dynamical systems. Specifically, we focus on hybrid systems with deterministic continuous-time dynamics that…
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley[GS62]. Given two instances $A$ and $B$ on the same set of agents, a matching is said to be robust if it is stable…
The Stable Marriage Problem, as proposed by Gale and Shapley, considers producing a bipartite matching between two equally sized sets of boys (proposers) and respectively girls (acceptors), each member having a total preference order over…
Many well-studied learning dynamics, such as fictitious play and the replicator, are known to not converge in general $N$-player games. The simplest mode of non-convergence is cyclical or periodic behavior. Such cycles are fundamental…
We study the notion of robustness in stable matching problems. We first define robustness by introducing (a,b)-supermatches. An $(a,b)$-supermatch is a stable matching in which if $a$ pairs break up it is possible to find another stable…
We focus on the one-to-one two-sided matching model with two disjoint sets of agents of equal size, where each agent in a set has preferences on the agents in the other set modeled by a linear order. A matching mechanism associates a set of…
We introduce the notion of stable solution in mean field game theory: they are locally isolated solutions of the mean field game system. We prove that such solutions exist in potential mean field games and are local attractors for learning…