Related papers: On beta-Plurality Points in Spatial Voting Games
In approval voting, individuals vote for all platforms that they find acceptable. In this situation it is natural to ask: When is agreement possible? What conditions guarantee that some fraction of the voters agree on even a single…
We study a generalization of the standard approval-based model of participatory budgeting (PB), in which voters are providing approval ballots over a set of predefined projects and -- in addition to a global budget limit, there are several…
Let a polytope $P$ be defined by a system $A x \leq b$. We consider the problem of counting the number of integer points inside $P$, assuming that $P$ is $\Delta$-modular, where the polytope $P$ is called $\Delta$-modular if all the rank…
For a finite point set $P \subset \mathbb{R}^d$, denote by $\text{diam}(P)$ the ratio of the largest to the smallest distances between pairs of points in $P$. Let $c_{d, \alpha}(n)$ be the largest integer $c$ such that any $n$-point set $P…
Studying the computational complexity and designing fast algorithms for determining winners under voting rules are classical and fundamental questions in computational social choice. In this paper, we accelerate voting by leveraging quantum…
We consider a distributed voting problem with a set of agents that are partitioned into disjoint groups and a set of obnoxious alternatives. Agents and alternatives are represented by points in a metric space. The goal is to compute the…
In the $R$-spread out, $d$-dimensional voter model, each site $x$ of $\mathbb{Z}^d$ has state (or 'opinion') 0 or 1 and, with rate 1, updates its opinion by copying that of some site $y$ chosen uniformly at random among all sites within…
We study how electoral rules shape polarization dynamics when voters and candidates both adapt to repeated election outcomes. We introduce two geometric primitives for comparing rules under this feedback: the \emph{winner radius} $R_t =…
We investigate the problem of winner determination from computational social choice theory in the data stream model. Specifically, we consider the task of summarizing an arbitrarily ordered stream of $n$ votes on $m$ candidates into a small…
Mutual coherence is a measure of similarity between two opinions. Although the notion comes from philosophy, it is essential for a wide range of technologies, e.g., the Wahl-O-Mat system. In Germany, this system helps voters to find…
Classical spatial models of two-party competition typically predict convergence to the median voter, yet real-world party systems often exhibit persistent and asymmetric polarization. We develop a spatial model of two-party competition in…
The problem of designing an optimal weighted voting system for the two-tier voting, applicable in the case of the Council of Ministers of the European Union (EU), is investigated. Various arguments in favour of the square root voting…
$\newcommand{\dist}{\operatorname{dist}}$ In this paper we define the notion of a probabilistic neighborhood in spatial data: Let a set $P$ of $n$ points in $\mathbb{R}^d$, a query point $q \in \mathbb{R}^d$, a distance metric $\dist$, and…
Complexity of voting manipulation is a prominent topic in computational social choice. In this work, we consider a two-stage voting manipulation scenario. First, a malicious party (an attacker) attempts to manipulate the election outcome in…
The proportional veto principle, which captures the idea that a candidate vetoed by a large group of voters should not be chosen, has been studied for ranked ballots in single-winner voting. We introduce a version of this principle for…
The well-known Condorcet Jury Theorem states that, under majority rule, the better of two alternatives is chosen with probability approaching one as the population grows. We study an asymmetric setting where voters face varying…
In this paper, we study voting rules on the interval domain, where the alternatives are arranged according to an externally given strict total order and voters report intervals of this order to indicate the alternatives they support. For…
Selecting $k$ out of $m$ items based on the preferences of $n$ heterogeneous agents is a widely studied problem in algorithmic game theory. If agents have approval preferences over individual items and harmonic utility functions over…
It is well known, by the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem, that when there are more than two candidates, any non-dictatorial voting rule can be manipulated by untruthful voters. But how strong is the incentive to manipulate under different…
The {\em Maximal} points in a set S are those that aren't {\em dominated} by any other point in S. Such points arise in multiple application settings in which they are called by a variety of different names, e.g., maxima, Pareto optimums,…