Related papers: Stackelberg Equilibria for Two-Player Network Rout…
In this paper, the problem of seeking optimal distributed resource allocation (DRA) policies on cellular networks in the presence of an unknown malicious adding-edge attacker is investigated. This problem is described as the games of games…
Deciding that two network flows are essentially the same is an important problem in intrusion detection or in tracing anonymous connections. A stepping stone or an anonymity network may try to prevent flow correlation by delaying the…
Network congestion games are a convenient model for reasoning about routing problems in a network: agents have to move from a source to a target vertex while avoiding congestion, measured as a cost depending on the number of players using…
This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…
We revisit a one-step control problem over an adversarial packet-dropping link. The link is modeled as a set of binary channels controlled by a strategic jammer whose intention is to wage a `denial of service' attack on the plant by…
With the constraint of a no regret follower, will the players in a two-player Stackelberg game still reach Stackelberg equilibrium? We first show when the follower strategy is either reward-average or transform-reward-average, the two…
We address two-player general-sum stochastic Stackelberg games (SSGs), where the leader's policy is optimized considering the best-response follower whose policy is optimal for its reward under the leader. Existing policy gradient and value…
In this paper, we study the framework of two-player Stackelberg games played on graphs in which Player 0 announces a strategy and Player 1 responds rationally with a strategy that is an optimal response. While it is usually assumed that…
In this paper, we study the transmission strategy adaptation problem in an RF-powered cognitive radio network, in which hybrid secondary users are able to switch between the harvest-then-transmit mode and the ambient backscatter mode for…
In the first part of this paper we have derived achievable transmission rates for the (single-band) interference relay channel (IRC) when the relay implements either the amplify-and-forward, decode-and-forward or estimate-and-forward…
In Stackelberg security games when information about the attacker's payoffs is uncertain, algorithms have been proposed to learn the optimal defender commitment by interacting with the attacker and observing their best responses. In this…
In a stochastic Stackelberg asymmetric security game, the strong Stackelberg equilibrium (SSE) strategy is a popular option for the defender to get the highest utility against an attacker with the best response (BR) strategy. However, the…
Peer-to-peer (P2P) energy trading is a promising market scheme to accommodate the increasing distributed energy resources (DERs). However, how P2P to be integrated into the existing power systems remains to be investigated. In this paper,…
In this paper, we present an efficient algorithm to solve online Stackelberg games, featuring multiple followers, in a follower-agnostic manner. Unlike previous works, our approach works even when leader has no knowledge about the…
This paper analyzes a class of Stackelberg games where different actors compete for shared resources and a central authority tries to balance the demand through a pricing mechanism. Situations like this can for instance occur when fleet…
We introduce and study incentive equilibria for multi-player meanpayoff games. Incentive equilibria generalise well-studied solution concepts such as Nash equilibria and leader equilibria (also known as Stackelberg equilibria). Recall that…
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks to enforce a desired property, or specification, despite an…
This paper addresses the security allocation problem in a networked control system under stealthy injection attacks. The networked system is comprised of interconnected subsystems which are represented by nodes in a digraph. An adversary…
We consider a repeated sequential game between a learner, who plays first, and an opponent who responds to the chosen action. We seek to design strategies for the learner to successfully interact with the opponent. While most previous…
We study a Stackelberg variant of the classical discrete-time Dynkin game, in which Player 1 (the leader) commits to a stopping strategy first and Player 2 (the follower) responds optimally. This leader-follower structure induces an optimal…