Related papers: Stackelberg Equilibria for Two-Player Network Rout…
We consider any network environment in which the "best shot game" is played. This is the case where the possible actions are only two for every node (0 and 1), and the best response for a node is 1 if and only if all her neighbors play 0. A…
Two-player mean-payoff Stackelberg games are nonzero-sum infinite duration games played on a bi-weighted graph by Leader (Player 0) and Follower (Player 1). Such games are played sequentially: first, Leader announces her strategy, second,…
Remote estimation is a crucial element of real time monitoring of a stochastic process. While most of the existing works have concentrated on obtaining optimal sampling strategies, motivated by malicious attacks on cyber-physical systems,…
A central question in routing games has been to establish conditions for the uniqueness of the equilibrium, either in terms of network topology or in terms of costs. This question is well understood in two classes of routing games. The…
We provide a general approach to reformulating any continuous-time stochastic Stackelberg differential game under closed-loop strategies as a single-level optimisation problem with target constraints. More precisely, we consider a…
Network games study the strategic interaction of agents connected through a network. Interventions in such a game -- actions a coordinator or planner may take that change the utility of the agents and thus shift the equilibrium action…
We study two-player security games which can be viewed as sequences of nonzero-sum matrix games played by an Attacker and a Defender. The evolution of the game is based on a stochastic fictitious play process. Players do not have access to…
We consider an autonomous navigation problem, whereby a traveler aims at traversing an environment in which an adversary tries to set an ambush. A two players zero sum game is introduced. Players' strategies are computed as random path…
We propose average unfairness as a new measure of fairness in routing games, defined as the ratio between the average latency and the minimum latency experienced by users. This measure is a natural complement to two existing unfairness…
This contribution deals with a two-level discrete decision problem, a so-called Stackelberg strategic game: A Subset Sum setting is addressed with a set $N$ of items with given integer weights. One distinguished player, the leader, may…
We consider the multi-agent spatial navigation problem of computing the socially optimal order of play, i.e., the sequence in which the agents commit to their decisions, and its associated equilibrium in an N-player Stackelberg trajectory…
Parallel server systems in transportation, manufacturing, and computing heavily rely on dynamic routing using connected cyber components for computation and communication. Yet, these components remain vulnerable to random malfunctions and…
We focus on adversarial patrolling games on arbitrary graphs, where the Defender can control a mobile resource, the targets are alarmed by an alarm system, and the Attacker can observe the actions of the mobile resource of the Defender and…
Many real-world strategic games involve interactions between multiple players. We study a hierarchical multi-player game structure, where players with asymmetric roles can be separated into leaders and followers, a setting often referred to…
From a perspective of designing or engineering for opinion formation games in social networks, the "opinion maximization (or minimization)" problem has been studied mainly for designing subset selecting algorithms. We define a two-player…
We study the problem of optimally investing in nodes of a social network in a competitive setting, wherein two camps aim to drive the average opinion of the population in their own favor. Using a well-established model of opinion dynamics,…
We propose a model for games in which the players have shared access to a blockchain that allows them to deploy smart contracts to act on their behalf. This changes fundamental game-theoretic assumptions about rationality since a contract…
This article studies a problem of strategic network inspection, in which a defender (agency) is tasked with detecting the presence of multiple attacks in the network. An inspection strategy entails monitoring the network components,…
The increasing prevalence of multi-agent learning systems in society necessitates understanding how to learn effective and safe policies in general-sum multi-agent environments against a variety of opponents, including self-play.…
We quantify the threat of network adversaries to inducing \emph{network overload} through \emph{routing attacks}, where a subset of network nodes are hijacked by an adversary. We develop routing attacks on the hijacked nodes for two…