Related papers: Open-loop and feedback Nash equilibrium in scalar …

In this paper, we show the equivalence between a constrained, multi-agent control problem, modeled within the port-Hamiltonian framework, and an exact potential game. Specifically, critical distance-based constraints determine a network of…

This paper delves into studying the differences and connections between open-loop and closed-loop strategies for the linear quadratic (LQ) mean field games (MFGs) by the direct approach. The investigation begins with the finite-population…

We present a framework for computing approximate mixed-strategy Nash equilibria of continuous-action games. It is a modification of the traditional double oracle algorithm, extended to multiple players and continuous action spaces. Unlike…

We consider a 3-player game in the normal form, in which each player has two actions. We assume that the game is symmetric and repeated infinitely many times. At each stage players make their choices knowing only the average payoffs from…

We consider multi-player stopping games in continuous time. Unlike Dynkin games, in our games the payoff of each player is revealed after all the players stop. Moreover, each player can adjust her own stopping strategy by observing other…

In a probabilistic mean-field game driven by a linear diffusion an individual player aims to minimize an ergodic long-run cost by controlling the diffusion through a pair of -- increasing and decreasing -- c\`adl\`ag processes, while he is…

In this paper, we consider two-player zero-sum matrix and stochastic games and develop learning dynamics that are payoff-based, convergent, rational, and symmetric between the two players. Specifically, the learning dynamics for matrix…

We investigate both stationary and time-varying, nonmonotone generalized Nash equilibrium problems that exhibit symmetric interactions among the agents, which are known to be potential. As may happen in practical cases, however, we envision…

We consider a class of Wasserstein distributionally robust Nash equilibrium problems, where agents construct heterogeneous data-driven Wasserstein ambiguity sets using private samples and radii, in line with their individual risk-averse…

Repeated games consider a situation where multiple agents are motivated by their independent rewards throughout learning. In general, the dynamics of their learning become complex. Especially when their rewards compete with each other like…

Game theory is playing more and more important roles in understanding complex systems and in investigating intelligent machines with various uncertainties. As a starting point, we consider the classical two-player zero-sum linear-quadratic…

In the theory of multi-agent systems, deception refers to the strategic manipulation of information to influence the behavior of other agents, ultimately altering the long-term dynamics of the entire system. Recently, this concept has been…

Nonzero sum games typically have multiple Nash equilibriums (or no equilibrium), and unlike the zero sum case, they may have different values at different equilibriums. Instead of focusing on the existence of individual equilibriums, we…

Nash equilibrium is the most commonly-used notion of equilibrium in game theory. However, it suffers from numerous problems. Some are well known in the game theory community; for example, the Nash equilibrium of repeated prisoner's dilemma…

We consider the class of two-person ordinal potential games where each player has the same number of actions $K$. Each game in this class admits at least one pure Nash equilibrium and the best-response dynamics converges to one of these…

We train two neural networks adversarially to play static games. At each iteration, a row and column network observe a new random bimatrix game and output individual mixed strategies. The parameters of each network are independently updated…

We investigate mean field games for players, who are weakly coupled via their empirical measure. To this end we investigate time-dependent pure jump type propagators over a finite space in the framework of non-linear Markov processes. We…

We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…

We investigate the convergence of symmetric stochastic differential games with interactions via control, where the volatility terms of both idiosyncratic and common noises are controlled. We apply the stochastic maximum principle, following…

In this article we compute analytically the number of Nash Equilibria (NE) for a two-choice game played on a (circular) ladder graph with $2n$ players. We consider a set of games with generic payoff parameters, with the only requirement…