Related papers: Gini Index based Initial Coin Offering Mechanism
Automated bidding to optimize online advertising with various constraints, e.g. ROI constraints and budget constraints, is widely adopted by advertisers. A key challenge lies in designing algorithms for non-truthful mechanisms with ROI…
We develop a method using parameterized linear equations to define trading mechanisms in market design models. Our method adeptly addresses challenges arising from factors such as complex endowments or coarse priorities, while offering…
We study the effect of altruism in two simple asset exchange models: the yard sale model (winner gets a random fraction of the poorer player's wealth) and the theft and fraud model (winner gets a random fraction of the loser's wealth). We…
Recent empirical work demonstrates that online advertisement can exhibit bias in the delivery of ads across users even when all advertisers bid in a non-discriminatory manner. We study the design of ad auctions that, given fair bids, are…
This paper studies real-time bidding mechanisms for economic dispatch and frequency regulation in electrical power networks. We consider a market administered by an independent system operator (ISO) where a group of strategic generators…
This work introduces a framework for evaluating onchain order flow auctions (OFAs), emphasizing the metric of price improvement. Utilizing a set of open-source tools, our methodology systematically attributes price improvements to specific…
We consider the problem of revenue-optimal dynamic mechanism design in settings where agents' types evolve over time as a function of their (both public and private) experience with items that are auctioned repeatedly over an infinite…
Existing results on cooperative control of multi-agent systems with unknown control directions require that the underlying topology is either fixed with a strongly connected graph or switching between different strongly connected graphs.…
The emergence of new communication technologies allows us to expand our understanding of distributed control and consider collaborative decision-making paradigms. With collaborative algorithms, certain local decision-making entities (or…
This whitepaper introduces RIV Coin, a cryptocurrency that is fully stabilized by a diversified portfolio of invested reserves that are evaluated by professional independent third parties, and auditable and provable by the protocol. It is…
We consider a class of generalized capital asset pricing models in continuous time with a finite number of agents and tradable securities. The securities may not be sufficient to span all sources of uncertainty. If the agents have…
In a combinatorial exchange setting, players place sell (resp. buy) bids on combinations of traded goods. Besides the question of finding an optimal selection of winning bids, the question of how to share the obtained profit is of high…
We study the optimal mechanism design problem faced by a market intermediary who makes revenue by connecting buyers and sellers. We first show that the optimal intermediation protocol has substantial structure: it is the solution to an…
Mechanism design in resource allocation studies dividing limited resources among self-interested agents whose satisfaction with the allocation depends on privately held utilities. We consider the problem in a payment-free setting, with the…
Since they were authorized by the U.S. Security and Exchange Commission in 1998, electronic exchanges have boomed, and by 2010 high frequency trading accounted for over 70% of equity trades in the US. Such markets are thought to increase…
Robust mechanism design is a rising alternative to Bayesian mechanism design, which yields designs that do not rely on assumptions like full distributional knowledge. We apply this approach to mechanisms for selling a single item, assuming…
In this paper we study the problem of allocating a scarce resource among several players (or agents). A central decision maker wants to maximize the total utility of all agents. However, such a solution may be unfair for one or more agents…
We consider the question of whether collusion among bidders (a "bidding ring") can be supported in equilibrium of unrepeated first-price auctions. Unlike previous work on the topic such as that by McAfee and McMillan [1992] and Marshall and…
As Machine Learning grows in popularity across various fields, equity has become a key focus for the AI community. However, fairness-oriented approaches are still underexplored in smart mobility. Addressing this gap, our study investigates…
The theory of algorithmic fair allocation is within the center of multi-agent systems and economics in the last decade due to its industrial and social importance. At a high level, the problem is to assign a set of items that are either…