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Quantum entanglement has been recently demonstrated as a useful resource in conflicting interest games of incomplete information between two players, Alice and Bob [Pappa et al., Phys. Rev. Lett. 114, 020401 (2015)]. General setting for…
In practice, most auction mechanisms are not strategy-proof, so equilibrium analysis is required to predict bidding behavior. In many auctions, though, an exact equilibrium is not known and one would like to understand whether -- manually…
We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfield et al. in 2013. Prior work has established that…
An informed seller designs a dynamic mechanism to sell an experience good. The seller has partial information about the product match, which affects the buyer's private consumption experience. We characterize equilibrium mechanisms of this…
A seller posts a price for a single object. The seller's and buyer's values may be interdependent. We characterize the set of payoff vectors across all information structures. Simple feasibility and individual-rationality constraints…
How does competition in markets for information affect the creation and division of surplus? We study this question in a search environment in which an agent searches sequentially for a high-quality good and learns about the quality of…
Conformal Prediction (CP) is a popular method for uncertainty quantification with machine learning models. While conformal prediction provides probabilistic guarantees regarding the coverage of the true label, these guarantees are agnostic…
Classic results show that even an arbitrarily small correlation across bidders' information can enable full surplus extraction in auctions and related mechanism design settings. Motivated by this fragility, we study the information…
We study the classic divide-and-choose method for equitably allocating divisible goods between two players who are rational, self-interested Bayesian agents. The players have additive values for the goods. The prior distributions on those…
Equity premium, the surplus returns of stocks over bonds, has been an enduring puzzle. While numerous prior works approach the problem assuming the utility of money is invariant across contexts, our approach implies that in efficient…
We study the computational complexity of computing Bayes-Nash equilibria in first-price auctions with discrete value distributions and discrete bidding space, under general subjective beliefs. It is known that such auctions do not always…
Several Artificial Intelligence schemes for reasoning under uncertainty explore either explicitly or implicitly asymmetries among probabilities of various states of their uncertain domain models. Even though the correct working of these…
Notwithstanding various attempts to construct a Partial Information Decomposition (PID) for multiple variables by defining synergistic, redundant, and unique information, there is no consensus on how one ought to precisely define either of…
We present an extensive analysis of the key problem of learning optimal reserve prices for generalized second price auctions. We describe two algorithms for this task: one based on density estimation, and a novel algorithm benefiting from…
In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…
We study information aggregation in a dynamic trading model with partially informed traders. Ostrovsky [2012] showed that `separable' securities aggregate information in all equilibria, however, determining whether a security is separable…
In an incomplete continuous-time securities market with uncertainty generated by Brownian motions, we derive closed-form solutions for the equilibrium interest rate and market price of risk processes. The economy has a finite number of…
Transparency of information disclosure has always been considered an instrumental component of effective governance, accountability, and ethical behavior in any organization or system. However, a natural question follows: \emph{what is the…
Equilibrium predictions in games of incomplete information are sensitive to the assumed information structure. Monderer and Samet (1996) and Kajii and Morris (1998) define topological notions of proximity for common prior information…
This paper introduces a novel information-theoretic perspective on the relationship between prominent group fairness notions in machine learning, namely statistical parity, equalized odds, and predictive parity. It is well known that…