Related papers: Common knowledge equilibrium of Boolean securities…
We embed observational learning (BHW) in a symmetric duopoly with random arrivals and search frictions. With fixed posted prices, a mixed-strategy pricing equilibrium exists and yields price dispersion even with ex-ante identical firms. We…
Equity-linked securities with a guaranteed return become very popular in financial markets ether as investment instruments or life insurance policies. The contract pays off a guaranteed amount plus a payment linked to the performance of a…
This paper studies learning in markets with aggregate uncertainty about whether trade is efficient. A long-lived seller offers prices to buyers, who are short-lived and arrive according to a Poisson process. A hidden state determines…
A competitive market is modeled as a game of incomplete information. One player observes some payoff-relevant state and can sell (possibly noisy) messages thereof to the other, whose willingness to pay is contingent on their own beliefs. We…
We consider a revenue optimizing seller selling a single item to a buyer, on whose private value the seller has a noisy signal. We show that, when the signal is kept private, arbitrarily more revenue could potentially be extracted than if…
We analyze the optimal information design in a click-through auction with fixed valuations per click, but stochastic click-through rates. While the auctioneer takes as given the auction rule of the click-through auction, namely the…
We study a class of two-player repeated games with incomplete information and informational externalities. In these games, two states are chosen at the outset, and players get private information on the pair, before engaging in repeated…
The mutual information of two random variables i and j with joint probabilities t_ij is commonly used in learning Bayesian nets as well as in many other fields. The chances t_ij are usually estimated by the empirical sampling frequency…
A homogeneously saturated equation for the time development of the price of a financial asset is presented and investigated for the pricing of European call options using noise that is distributed as a Student's t-distribution. In the limit…
We study a seller who sells a single good to multiple bidders with uncertainty over the joint distribution of bidders' valuations, as well as bidders' higher-order beliefs about their opponents. The seller only knows the (possibly…
An effective distribution electricity market (DEM) is required to manage the rapidly growing small-scale distributed energy resources (DERs) in distribution systems (DSs). This paper proposes a day-ahead DEM clearing and pricing mechanism…
We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that…
We consider the problem of aligning a pair of databases with correlated entries. We introduce a new measure of correlation in a joint distribution that we call cycle mutual information. This measure has operational significance: it…
This paper studies matching markets in the presence of middlemen. In our framework, a buyer-seller pair may either trade directly or use the services of a middleman; and a middleman may serve multiple buyer-seller pairs. Direct trade…
This paper investigates the effect of cross-shareholding on stock price synchronicity, as a measure of price informativeness, of the listed firms in the Chinese stock market. We gauge firms' levels of cross-shareholdings in terms of…
Conformal prediction is a popular, modern technique for providing valid predictive inference for arbitrary machine learning models. Its validity relies on the assumptions of exchangeability of the data, and symmetry of the given model…
In many decision-making scenarios, individuals strategically choose what information to disclose to optimize their own outcomes. It is unclear whether such strategic information disclosure can lead to good societal outcomes. To address this…
Peer-prediction is a (meta-)mechanism which, given any proper scoring rule, produces a mechanism to elicit privately-held, non-verifiable information from self-interested agents. Formally, truth-telling is a strict Nash equilibrium of the…
We model a system of n asymmetric firms selling a homogeneous good in a common market through a pay-as-bid auction. Every producer chooses as its strategy a supply function returning the quantity S(p) that it is willing to sell at a minimum…
We consider portfolio selection under nonparametric $\alpha$-maxmin ambiguity in the neighbourhood of a reference distribution. We show strict concavity of the portfolio problem under ambiguity aversion. Implied demand functions are…