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Simple adaptive procedures that converge to correlated equilibria are known to exist for normal form games (Hart and Mas-Colell 2000), but no such analogue exists for extensive-form games. Leveraging inspiration from Zinkevich et al.…
In this paper, a new method is proposed to compute the rolling Nash equilibrium of the time-invariant nonlinear two-person zero-sum differential games. The idea is to discretize the time to transform a differential game into a sequential…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
We investigate optimal decision making under imperfect recall, that is, when an agent forgets information it once held before. An example is the absentminded driver game, as well as team games in which the members have limited communication…
Infinitely repeated games support equilibrium concepts beyond those present in one-shot games (e.g., cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma). Nonetheless, repeated games fail to capture our real-world intuition for settings with many…
Infinitely repeated games can support cooperative outcomes that are not equilibria in the one-shot game. The idea is to make sure that any gains from deviating will be offset by retaliation in future rounds. However, this model of…
Designing efficient algorithms to find Nash equilibrium (NE) refinements in sequential games is of paramount importance in practice. Indeed, it is well known that the NE has several weaknesses, since it may prescribe to play sub-optimal…
We show that natural classes of regularized learning algorithms with a form of recency bias achieve faster convergence rates to approximate efficiency and to coarse correlated equilibria in multiplayer normal form games. When each player in…
In this paper, we study the problem of learning the set of pure strategy Nash equilibria and the exact structure of a continuous-action graphical game with quadratic payoffs by observing a small set of perturbed equilibria. A…
In many real-world settings agents engage in strategic interactions with multiple opposing agents who can employ a wide variety of strategies. The standard approach for designing agents for such settings is to compute or approximate a…
In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and…
Subgame solving is a technique for scaling algorithms to large games by locally refining a precomputed blueprint strategy during gameplay. While straightforward in perfect-information games where search starts from the current state,…
Replicator dynamics, the continuous-time analogue of Multiplicative Weights Updates, is the main dynamic in evolutionary game theory. In simple evolutionary zero-sum games, such as Rock-Paper-Scissors, replicator dynamic is periodic…
Best-response mechanisms (Nisan, Schapira, Valiant, Zohar, 2011) provide a unifying framework for studying various distributed protocols in which the participants are instructed to repeatedly best respond to each others' strategies. Two…
Many efficient algorithms have been designed to recover Nash equilibria of various classes of finite games. Special classes of continuous games with infinite strategy spaces, such as polynomial games, can be solved by semidefinite…
In this paper, we examine the robustness of Nash equilibria in continuous games, under both strategic and dynamic uncertainty. Starting with the former, we introduce the notion of a robust equilibrium as those equilibria that remain…
This paper considers a two-player game where each player chooses a resource from a finite collection of options. Each resource brings a random reward. Both players have statistical information regarding the rewards of each resource.…
Search in test time is often used to improve the performance of reinforcement learning algorithms. Performing theoretically sound search in fully adversarial two-player games with imperfect information is notoriously difficult and requires…
Generating payoff matrices of normal-form games at random, we calculate the frequency of games with a unique pure strategy Nash equilibrium in the ensemble of $n$-player, $m$-strategy games. These are perfectly predictable as they must…
In noncooperative Nash games, equilibria are often inefficient. This is exemplified by the Prisoner's Dilemma and was first provably shown in the 1980s. Since then, understanding the quality of Nash equilibrium (NE) received considerable…