Related papers: The Complexity of Interactively Learning a Stable …
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…
In the stable marriage and roommates problems, a set of agents is given, each of them having a strictly ordered preference list over some or all of the other agents. A matching is a set of disjoint pairs of mutually accepted agents. If any…
In two-sided matching markets, ensuring both stability and strategy-proofness poses a significant challenge; it is impossible when agents' preferences are unrestricted. But what if agents' preferences have specific restricted structures?…
Two-sided matching platforms provide users with menus of match recommendations. To maximize the number of realized matches between the two sides (referred here as customers and suppliers), the platform must balance the inherent tension…
We introduce a `concrete complexity' model for studying algorithms for matching in bipartite graphs. The model is based on the "demand query" model used for combinatorial auctions. Most (but not all) known algorithms for bipartite matching…
Learned indexes leverage machine learning models to accelerate query answering in databases, showing impressive practical performance. However, theoretical understanding of these methods remains incomplete. Existing research suggests that…
We survey the problem of deciding the stability or stabilizability of uncertain linear systems whose region of uncertainty is a polytope. This natural setting has applications in many fields of applied science, from Control Theory to…
We study the competition for partners in two-sided matching markets with heterogeneous agent preferences, with a focus on how the equilibrium outcomes depend on the connectivity in the market. We model random partially connected markets,…
We study the existence of stable matchings when agents have choice correspondences instead of preference relations. We extend the framework of \cite{chambers2017choice} by weakening the path independence assumption. For many-to-many…
We study a dynamic market setting where an intermediary interacts with an unknown large sequence of agents that can be either sellers or buyers: their identities, as well as the sequence length $n$, are decided in an adversarial, online…
Two-sided online matching platforms are employed in various markets. However, agents' preferences in the current market are usually implicit and unknown, thus needing to be learned from data. With the growing availability of dynamic side…
We consider a many-to-one matching market where colleges share true preferences over students but make decisions using only independent noisy rankings. Each student has a true value $v$, but each college $c$ ranks the student according to…
In this paper, we investigate stable matching in structured networks. Consider case of matching in social networks where candidates are not fully connected. A candidate on one side of the market gets acquaintance with which one on the…
We introduce a new algorithm for finding stable matchings in multi-sided matching markets. Our setting is motivated by a PhD market of students, advisors, and co-advisors, and can be generalized to supply chain networks viewed as $n$-sided…
Centralized assignment markets have historically relied on Deferred-Acceptance (DA) algorithms, which do not incorporate multiple objectives into the assignment. In this work, we propose an optimization-based many-to-one assignment…
In many matching markets, one side "applies" to the other, and these applications are often expensive and time-consuming (e.g. students applying to college). It is tempting to think that making the application process easier should benefit…
We study the design of one-to-one matching mechanisms that are strategy-proof for both sides and as stable as possible. Motivated by the impossibility result of Roth (1982), we formulate the mechanism design problem as a linear program that…
In this paper, we consider a matroid generalization of the stable matching problem. In particular, we consider the setting where preferences may contain ties. For this generalization, we propose a polynomial-time algorithm for the problem…
Online bidding is a classic optimization problem, with several applications in online decision-making, the design of interruptible systems, and the analysis of approximation algorithms. In this work, we study online bidding under…
A matching queue is described via a graph $G$ together with a matching policy. Specifically, to each node in the graph there is a corresponding arrival process of items which can either be queued, or matched with queued items in neighboring…