Related papers: Convex Combinatorial Auction of Pipeline Network C…
Transportation network design often involves multiple stakeholders with diverse priorities. We consider a system with a hierarchical multi-agent structure, featuring self-optimized subnetwork operators at the lower level and a central…
In this note we study the greedy algorithm for combinatorial auctions with submodular bidders. It is well known that this algorithm provides an approximation ratio of $2$ for every order of the items. We show that if the valuations are…
Traditional combinatorial spectrum auctions mainly rely on fixed bidding and matching processes, which limit participants' ability to adapt their strategies and often result in suboptimal social welfare in dynamic spectrum sharing…
Digital advertising constitutes one of the main revenue sources for online platforms. In recent years, some advertisers tend to adopt auto-bidding tools to facilitate advertising performance optimization, making the classical \emph{utility…
A key challenge in combinatorial auctions is designing bid formats that accurately capture agents' preferences while remaining computationally feasible. This is especially true for electricity auctions, where complex preferences complicate…
Device to device communication has prevailed as an issue for small cell networks. Here we have implemented a new scheme that allows us to improve spectral capabilities of mobiles communicating with each other (peer to peer network) for…
This paper studies the use of a multi-attribute auction in a communication system to bring about efficient relaying in a non-cooperative setting. We consider a system where a source seeks to offload data to an access point (AP) while…
Bidding flexibility in day-ahead and intraday auctions would enable decentralized flexible resources, such as electric vehicles and heat pumps, to efficiently align their consumption with the intermittent generation of renewable energy.…
In this paper, spectrum access in cognitive radio networks is modeled as a repeated auction game subject to monitoring and entry costs. For secondary users, sensing costs are incurred as the result of primary users' activity. Furthermore,…
Revealed preference techniques are used to test whether a data set is compatible with rational behaviour. They are also incorporated as constraints in mechanism design to encourage truthful behaviour in applications such as combinatorial…
A novel distributed energy allocation mechanism for Distribution System Operator (DSO) market through a bi-level iterative auction is proposed. With the locational marginal price at the substation node known, the DSO runs an upper level…
This work proposes a bid shading strategy for first-price auctions as a measure-valued optimization problem. We consider a standard parametric form for bid shading and formulate the problem as convex optimization over the joint distribution…
This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP),…
The combinatorial auction (CA) is an efficient mechanism for resource allocation in different fields, including cloud computing. It can obtain high economic efficiency and user flexibility by allowing bidders to submit bids for combinations…
The Combinatorial Multi-Round Ascending Auction (CMRA) is a new auction format used in recent European spectrum auctions. We show that an auction-specific version of truthful bidding leads to an efficient allocation. We then characterize…
We consider budget constrained combinatorial auctions where bidder $i$ has a private value $v_i$, a budget $b_i$, and is interested in all the items in $S_i$. The value to agent $i$ of a set of items $R$ is $|R \cap S_i| \cdot v_i$. Such…
We improve the best known competitive ratio (from 1/4 to 1/2), for the online multi-unit allocation problem, where the objective is to maximize the single-price revenue. Moreover, the competitive ratio of our algorithm tends to 1, as the…
Pricing is an important issue in mobile edge computing. How to appropriately determine the bid of end user (EU) is an incentive factor for edge cloud (EC) to offer service. In this letter, we propose an equilibrium pricing scheme based on…
The auction theory literature has so far focused mostly on the design of mechanisms that takes the revenue or the efficiency as a yardstick. However, scenarios where the {\it capacity}, which we define as \textit{``the number of bidders the…
We design an expected polynomial-time, truthful-in-expectation, (1-1/e)-approximation mechanism for welfare maximization in a fundamental class of combinatorial auctions. Our results apply to bidders with valuations that are m matroid rank…