Related papers: Convex Combinatorial Auction of Pipeline Network C…
A single advertisement often benefits many parties, for example, an ad for a Samsung laptop benefits Microsoft. We study this phenomenon in search advertising auctions and show that standard solutions, including the status quo ignorance of…
We evaluate the applicability of the generic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism as an antimonopoly measure against a profit-maximizing producer with market power operating a portfolio of generating units at the centralized two-settlement…
In this paper, we assess the applicability of auctions based on the Vickrey second price model for allocating wireless spectrum in developing countries. We first provide an overview of auction models for allocating resources. We then…
Sponsored search auctions are commonly modeled as an assignment of a fixed set of slots (positions) to a set of advertisers, with welfare maximization being reducible to a standard matching problem. Motivated by modern ad formats, we study…
The existence of incentive-compatible computationally-efficient protocols for combinatorial auctions with decent approximation ratios is the paradigmatic problem in computational mechanism design. It is believed that in many cases good…
Combinatorial auctions are formulated as frustrated lattice gases on sparse random graphs, allowing the determination of the optimal revenue by methods of statistical physics. Transitions between computationally easy and hard regimes are…
In this article we consider combinatorial markets with valuations only for singletons and pairs of buy/sell-orders for swapping two items in equal quantity. We provide an algorithm that permits polynomial time market-clearing and -pricing.…
Cooperative transmission can greatly improve communication system performance by taking advantage of the broadcast nature of wireless channels. Most previous work on resource allocation for cooperation transmission is based on centralized…
Combinatorial auctions are used to allocate resources in domains where bidders have complex preferences over bundles of goods. However, the behavior of bidders under different payment rules is not well understood, and there has been limited…
In traditional public blockchain networks, transaction fees are only allocated to full nodes (i.e., miners). However, the lack of relay rewards reduces the willingness of light nodes to relay transactions, especially in the…
With the growth of networks, promoting products through social networks has become an important problem. For auctions in social networks, items are needed to be sold to agents in a network, where each agent can bid and also diffuse the sale…
A mobile cloud computing system is composed of heterogeneous services and resources to be allocated by the cloud service provider to mobile cloud users. On one hand, some of these resources are substitutable (e.g., users can use storage…
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism is infamously revenue non-monotone in combinatorial auctions. I.e., when a buyer increases their value for a bundle of items, the total auction revenue may decrease. Combinatorial auctions exhibit…
We consider the problem of online dynamic mechanism design for sequential auctions in unknown environments, where the underlying market and, thus, the bidders' values vary over time as interactions between the seller and the bidders…
For Bayesian combinatorial auctions, we present a general framework for approximately reducing the mechanism design problem for multiple buyers to single buyer sub-problems. Our framework can be applied to any setting which roughly…
Most modern ticketing systems rely on a first-come-first-serve or randomized allocation system to determine the allocation of tickets. Such systems has received considerable backlash in recent years due to its inequitable allotment and…
Recent spectrum auctions in the United Kingdom, and some proposals for future auctions of spectrum in the United States, are based on preliminary price discovery rounds, followed by calculation of final prices for the winning buyers. For…
In this paper, we propose a novel sealed-bid auction framework to address the problem of dynamic spectrum allocation in cognitive radio (CR) networks. We design an optimal auction mechanism that maximizes the moderator's expected utility,…
Many network resource allocation problems can be viewed as allocating a divisible resource, where the allocations are constrained to lie in a polymatroid. We consider market-based mechanisms for such problems. Though the…
Network slicing is a key 5G technology that enables multiple virtual networks to share physical infrastructure, optimizing flexibility and resource allocation. This involves Mobile Network Operators (MNO), Mobile Virtual Network Operators…