Related papers: An optimal mechanism charging for priority in a qu…
We investigate the power of randomness in the context of a fundamental Bayesian optimal mechanism design problem--a single seller aims to maximize expected revenue by allocating multiple kinds of resources to "unit-demand" agents with…
We study revenue maximization in settings where agents' values are interdependent: each agent receives a signal drawn from a correlated distribution and agents' values are functions of all of the signals. We introduce a variant of the…
We develop a framework for the optimal pricing and product design of LLMs in which a provider sells menus of token budgets to users who differ in their valuations across a continuum of tasks. Under a homogeneous production technology, we…
Consider the following random process: we are given $n$ queues, into which elements of increasing labels are inserted uniformly at random. To remove an element, we pick two queues at random, and remove the element of lower label (higher…
This paper focuses on the problem of finding a particular data recommendation strategy based on the user preferences and a system expected revenue. To this end, we formulate this problem as an optimization by designing the recommendation…
We study robust mechanisms to sell a common-value good. We assume that the mechanism designer knows the prior distribution of the buyers' common value but is unsure of the buyers' information structure about the common value. We use linear…
In mechanism design it is typical to impose incentive compatibility and then derive an optimal mechanism subject to this constraint. By replacing the incentive compatibility requirement with the goal of minimizing expected ex post regret,…
In this paper, we study the pickup and delivery problem with multiple transportation modalities, and address the challenge of efficiently allocating transportation resources while price matching users with their desired delivery modes. More…
We study the mechanism design problem of selling $k$ items to unit-demand buyers with private valuations for the items. A buyer either participates directly in the auction or is represented by an intermediary, who represents a subset of…
We consider a revenue maximization model, in which a company aims at designing a menu of contracts, given a population of customers. A standard approach consists in constructing an incentive-compatible continuum of contracts, i.e., a menu…
Mobile data traffic has been steadily rising in the past years. This has generated a significant interest in the deployment of incentive mechanisms to reduce peak-time congestion. Typically, the design of these mechanisms requires…
Consider an unobservable $M|G|1$ queue with preemptive-resume scheduling and two priority classes. Customers are strategic and may join the premium class for a fee. We analyze the resulting equilibrium outcomes, equilibrium stability, and…
The proliferation of ride sharing systems is a major drive in the advancement of autonomous and electric vehicle technologies. This paper considers the joint routing, battery charging, and pricing problem faced by a profit-maximizing…
A decision maker is choosing between an active action (e.g., purchase a house, invest certain stock) and a passive action. The payoff of the active action depends on the buyer's private type and also an unknown state of nature. An…
Mechanisms such as auctions and pricing schemes are utilized to design strategic (noncooperative) games for networked systems. Although the participating players are selfish, these mechanisms ensure that the game outcome is optimal with…
CPU scheduling is the reason behind the performance of multiprocessing and in time-shared operating systems. Different scheduling criteria are used to evaluate Central Processing Unit Scheduling algorithms which are based on different…
On-demand transport services in the form of dial-a-ride and taxis are crucial parts of the transport infrastructure in all major cities. However, not all on-demand transport services are equal. In particular, not-for-profit dial-a-ride…
Situations where a group of agents come together to jointly buy a resource that they individually cannot afford to buy are commonly observed in markets. For example in the US market for radio spectrum, a recent proposal invited small firms…
We consider the problem of customer equilibrium strategies in an M/M/1 queue under dynamic service control. The service rate switches between a low and a high value depending on system congestion. Arriving customers do not observe the…
We advance a recently flourishing line of work at the intersection of learning theory and computational economics by studying the learnability of two classes of mechanisms prominent in economics, namely menus of lotteries and two-part…