Related papers: Duopolistic platform competition for revenue and t…
In a two-sided marketplace, network effects are crucial for competitiveness, and platforms need to retain users through advanced customer relationship management as much as possible. Maintaining numerous providers' stable and active…
Payment networks were introduced to address the limitation on the transaction throughput of popular blockchains. To open a payment channel one has to publish a transaction on-chain and pay the appropriate transaction fee. A transaction can…
We consider the process of bidding by electricity suppliers in a day-ahead market context where each supplier bids a linear non-decreasing function of her generating capacity with the goal of maximizing her individual profit given other…
We study a game between two firms in which each provide a service based on machine learning. The firms are presented with the opportunity to purchase a new corpus of data, which will allow them to potentially improve the quality of their…
We model real-world data markets, where sellers post fixed prices and buyers are free to purchase from any set of sellers, as a simultaneous game. A key component here is the negative externality buyers induce on one another due to data…
Flexibility is a cornerstone of operations management, crucial to hedge stochasticity in product demands, service requirements, and resource allocation. In two-sided platforms, flexibility is also two-sided and can be viewed as the…
We study a two-player model of conflict with multiple battlefields -- the novel element is that each of the players has their own network of spillovers so that resources allocated to one battle can be utilized in winning neighboring…
We describe a two-stage mechanism that fully implements the set of efficient outcomes in two-agent environments with quasi-linear utilities. The mechanism asks one agent to set prices for each outcome, and the other agent to make a choice,…
In many two-sided markets, the parties to be matched have incomplete information about their characteristics. We consider the settings where the parties engaged are extremely patient and are interested in long-term partnerships. Hence, once…
We analyze the effects of enforcing vs. exempting access ISP from net neutrality regulations when platforms are present and operate two-sided pricing in their business models. This study is conducted in a scenario where users and Content…
We consider a variant of Cournot competition, where multiple firms allocate the same amount of resource across multiple markets. We prove that the game has a unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (NE), which is symmetric and is…
We propose a two-layer stochastic game model to study reinsurance contracting and competition in a market with one insurer and two competing reinsurers. The insurer negotiates with both reinsurers simultaneously for proportional reinsurance…
We study the competition of two strategic agents for liquidity in the benchmark portfolio tracking setup of Bank, Soner, Vo{\ss} (2017). Specifically, both agents track their own stochastic running trading targets while interacting through…
We propose a solution and a mechanism for two-agent social choice problems with large (infinite) policy spaces. Our solution is an efficient compromise rule between the two agents, built on a common cardinalization of their preferences. Our…
We study collaborative learning systems in which the participants are competitors who will defect from the system if they lose revenue by collaborating. As such, we frame the system as a duopoly of competitive firms who are each engaged in…
We consider a contest game modelling a contest where reviews for $m$ proposals are crowdsourced from $n$ strategic agents} players. Player $i$ has a skill $s_{i\ell}$ for reviewing proposal $\ell$; for her review, she strategically chooses…
We study a two-sided online data ecosystem comprised of an online platform, users on the platform, and downstream learners or data buyers. The learners can buy user data on the platform (to run a statistic or machine learning task).…
A mechanism is described that addresses the fundamental trade off between media producers who want to increase reach and consumers who provide attention based on the rate of utility received, and where overreach negatively impacts that…
Electricity markets differ in their ability to meet power imbalances in short notice in a controlled fashion. Relatively flexible markets have the ability to ramp up (or down) power flows across interties without compromising their ability…
One key in real-life Nash equilibrium applications is to calibrate players' cost functions. To leverage the approximation ability of neural networks, we proposed a general framework for optimizing and learning Nash equilibrium using neural…