Related papers: Stable Matchings with Diversity Constraints: Affir…
This paper focuses on two-sided matching where one side (a hospital or firm) is matched to the other side (a doctor or worker) so as to maximize a cardinal objective under general feasibility constraints. In a standard model, even though…
We study parameterized approximability of three optimization problems related to stable matching: (1) Min-BP-SMI: Given a stable marriage instance and a number k, find a size-at-least-k matching that minimizes the number $\beta$ of blocking…
We consider the problem of allocating applicants to courses, where each applicant has a subset of acceptable courses that she ranks in strict order of preference. Each applicant and course has a capacity, indicating the maximum number of…
In the fundamental Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching always exists and can be found efficiently using the…
The Stable Matching Problem with Couples (SMP-C) is a ubiquitous real-world extension of the stable matching problem (SMP) involving complementarities. Although SMP can be solved in polynomial time, SMP-C is NP-Complete. Hence, it is not…
Permutation Pattern Matching (or PPM) is a decision problem whose input is a pair of permutations $\pi$ and $\tau$, represented as sequences of integers, and the task is to determine whether $\tau$ contains a subsequence order-isomorphic to…
In this paper we show that the following problem is NP-complete: Given an alphabet $\Sigma$ and two strings over $\Sigma$, the question is whether there exists a permutation of $\Sigma$ which is a subsequence of both of the given strings.
We investigate the complexity of approximately counting stable matchings in the $k$-attribute model, where the preference lists are determined by dot products of "preference vectors" with "attribute vectors", or by Euclidean distances…
We study the Popular Matching problem in multiple models, where the preferences of the agents in the instance may change or may be unknown/uncertain. In particular, we study an Uncertainty model, where each agent has a possible set of…
We continue and extend previous work on the parameterized complexity analysis of the NP-hard Stable Roommates with Ties and Incomplete Lists problem, thereby strengthening earlier results both on the side of parameterized hardness as well…
Optimization is fundamental in many areas of science, from computer science and information theory to engineering and statistical physics, as well as to biology or social sciences. It typically involves a large number of variables and a…
In many matching markets--such as athlete recruitment or academic admissions--participants on one side are evaluated by attribute vectors known to the other side, which in turn applies individual \emph{salience vectors} to assign relative…
We introduce the problem of adapting a stable matching to forced and forbidden pairs. Specifically, given a stable matching $M_1$, a set $Q$ of forced pairs, and a set $P$ of forbidden pairs, we want to find a stable matching that includes…
The balance between convergence and diversity is a key issue of evolutionary multi-objective optimization. The recently proposed stable matching-based selection provides a new perspective to handle this balance under the framework of…
Matching problems with group-fairness constraints and diversity constraints have numerous applications such as in allocation problems, committee selection, school choice, etc. Moreover, online matching problems have lots of applications in…
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm of near-feasibility in capacitated matching settings, where…
We study the three-dimensional stable matching problem with cyclic preferences. This model involves three types of agents, with an equal number of agents of each type. The types form a cyclic order such that each agent has a complete…
The efficient computation of large matchings with desirable guarantees is a crucial objective in market design. However, even in simple two-sided matching markets with weak ordinal preferences, finding a maximum-size stable matching is…
We study the Reaching Stable Marriage via Divorces (DivorceSM) problem of deciding, given a Stable Marriage instance and an initial matching $M$ , whether there exists a stable matching which is reachable from $M$ by divorce operations as…
I study the relationship between diversity preferences and the choice rules implemented by institutions, with a particular focus on the affirmative action policies. I characterize the choice rules that can be rationalized by diversity…