Related papers: Stable Matchings with Diversity Constraints: Affir…
In a multiple partners matching problem the agents can have multiple partners up to their capacities. In this paper we consider both the two-sided many-to-many stable matching problem and the one-sided stable fixtures problem under…
Stable matching theory is the foundation of centralized clearinghouses worldwide, from school choice programs to medical residency allocations. However, incorporating complex distributional goals-such as multi-dimensional diversity quotas…
In the {\sc Course Allocation} problem, there are a set of students and a set of courses at a given university. University courses may have different numbers of credits, typically related to different numbers of learning hours, and there…
We propose a generalization of the classical stable marriage problem. In our model, the preferences on one side of the partition are given in terms of arbitrary binary relations, which need not be transitive nor acyclic. This generalization…
In the multidimensional stable roommate problem, agents have to be allocated to rooms and have preferences over sets of potential roommates. We study the complexity of finding good allocations of agents to rooms under the assumption that…
I settle the computational complexity of student-project-resource matching-allocation problems, in which students and resources are assigned to projects \citep{pc2017}. A project's capacity for students is endogenously determined by the…
Super-stability is one of the stability concepts in the stable matching problem with ties. It is known that there may not exist a super-stable matching, and the existence of a super-stable matching can be checked in polynomial time. In this…
The many-to-one stable matching problem provides the fundamental abstraction of several real-world matching markets such as school choice and hospital-resident allocation. The agents on both sides are often referred to as residents and…
While the existence of a stable matching for the stable roommates problem possibly with incomplete preference lists (SRI) can be decided in polynomial time, SRI problems with some fairness criteria are intractable. Egalitarian SRI that…
In this paper we consider stable matchings subject to assignment constraints. These are matchings that require certain assigned pairs to be included, insist that some other assigned pairs are not, and, importantly, are stable. Our main…
Motivated by the theory of proof complexity generators we consider the following $\Sigma^p_2$ search problem $\mbox{DD}_P$ determined by a propositional proof system $P$: given a $P$-proof $\pi$ of a disjunction $\bigvee_i {\alpha}_i$, no…
We study the Student Project Allocation problem with lecturer preferences over Students (SPA-S), which involves the assignment of students to projects based on student preferences over projects, lecturer preferences over students, and…
We study uncoordinated matching markets with additional local constraints that capture, e.g., restricted information, visibility, or externalities in markets. Each agent is a node in a fixed matching network and strives to be matched to…
We consider many-to-one matching problems, where one side consists of students and the other side of schools with capacity constraints. We study how to optimally increase the capacities of the schools so as to obtain a stable and perfect…
We consider Stable Marriage with Covering Constraints (SMC): in this variant of Stable Marriage, we distinguish a subset of women as well as a subset of men, and we seek a matching with fewest number of blocking pairs that matches all of…
In the stable marriage problem, a set of men and a set of women are given, each of whom has a strictly ordered preference list over the acceptable agents in the opposite class. A matching is called stable if it is not blocked by any pair of…
An input to the Popular Matching problem, in the roommates setting, consists of a graph $G$ and each vertex ranks its neighbors in strict order, known as its preference. In the Popular Matching problem the objective is to test whether there…
The stable marriage and stable roommates problems have been extensively studied due to their high applicability in various real-world scenarios. However, it might happen that no stable solution exists, or stable solutions do not meet…
The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the…
We study stable matching problems where agents have multilayer preferences: There are $\ell$ layers each consisting of one preference relation for each agent. Recently, Chen et al. [EC '18] studied such problems with strict preferences,…