Related papers: Generalized Rental Harmony
Roommate problems with convex preferences always have stable matchings. Efficiency and individual rationality are, moreover, compatible with strategyproofness in such convex roommate problems. Both of these results fail without the…
Nearest neighbor methods are a popular class of nonparametric estimators with several desirable properties, such as adaptivity to different distance scales in different regions of space. Prior work on convergence rates for nearest neighbor…
In Schelling's segregation model agents of two ethnic groups reside in a regular grid and aim to live in a neighborhood that matches the minimum desired fraction of members of the same ethnicity. The model shows that observed segregation…
Research regarding the stable marriage and roommate problem has a long and distinguished history in mathematics, computer science and economics. Stability in this context is predominantly core stability or one of its variants in which each…
We consider stability concepts for random matchings where agents have preferences over objects and objects have priorities for the agents. When matchings are deterministic, the standard stability concept also captures the fairness property…
Recent trends in planning research have led to empirical comparison becoming commonplace. The field has started to settle into a methodology for such comparisons, which for obvious practical reasons requires running a subset of planners on…
A method is given for quantitatively rating the social acceptance of different options which are the matter of a preferential vote. In contrast to a previous article, here the individual votes are allowed to be incomplete, that is, they…
We study one-sided matching problems where $n$ agents have preferences over $m$ objects and each of them need to be assigned to at most one object. Most work on such problems assume that the agents only have ordinal preferences and usually…
In the Hospital Residents problem with lower and upper quotas ($HR-Q^U_L$), the goal is to find a stable matching of residents to hospitals where the number of residents matched to a hospital is either between its lower and upper quota or…
We study fairness in house allocation, where $m$ houses are to be allocated among $n$ agents so that every agent receives one house. We show that maximizing the number of envy-free agents is hard to approximate to within a factor of…
We propose a novel model for refugee housing respecting the preferences of the accepting community and refugees themselves. In particular, we are given a topology representing the local community, a set of inhabitants occupying some…
In the marriage problem, a variant of the bi-parted matching problem, each member has a `wish-list' expressing his/her preference for all possible partners; this list consists of random, positive real numbers drawn from a certain…
The stable roommates problem can admit multiple different stable matchings. We have different criteria for deciding which one is optimal, but computing those is often NP-hard. We show that the problem of finding generous or rank-maximal…
We study control problems in the context of matching under preferences: We examine how a central authority, called the controller, can manipulate an instance of the Stable Marriage or Stable Roommates problems in order to achieve certain…
This paper addresses the slicing of Radio Access Network (RAN) resources by multiple tenants, e.g., virtual wireless operators and service providers. We consider a criterion for dynamic resource allocation amongst tenants, based on a…
Schelling's famous model of segregation assumes agents of different types who would like to be located in neighborhoods having at least a certain fraction of agents of the same type. We consider natural generalizations that allow for the…
Schelling's model is an influential model that reveals how individual perceptions and incentives can lead to residential segregation. Inspired by a recent stream of work, we study welfare guarantees and complexity in this model with respect…
This article interprets emerging scholarship on rental housing platforms -- particularly the most well-known and used short- and long-term rental housing platforms - and considers how the technological processes connecting both short-term…
We study the problem of assigning agents to the vertices of a graph such that no pair of neighbors can benefit from swapping assignments -- a property we term neighborhood stability. We further assume that agents' utilities are based solely…
We consider a multi-agent resource allocation setting that models the assignment of papers to reviewers. A recurring issue in allocation problems is the compatibility of welfare/efficiency and fairness. Given an oracle to find a…