Related papers: Mean Field Games with Branching
In this paper, we introduce discrete-time linear mean-field games subject to an infinite-horizon discounted-cost optimality criterion. The state space of a generic agent is a compact Borel space. At every time, each agent is randomly…
Subject to reasonable conditions, in large population stochastic dynamics games, where the agents are coupled by the system's mean field (i.e. the state distribution of the generic agent) through their nonlinear dynamics and their nonlinear…
We study the convergence of Nash equilibria in a game of optimal stopping. If the associated mean field game has a unique equilibrium, any sequence of $n$-player equilibria converges to it as $n\to\infty$. However, both the finite and…
In this paper, we investigate the interaction of two populations with a large number of indistinguishable agents. The problem consists in two levels: the interaction between agents of a same population, and the interaction between the two…
Financial markets and more generally macro-economic models involve a large number of individuals interacting through variables such as prices resulting from the aggregate behavior of all the agents. Mean field games have been introduced to…
In this article, we consider mean field games between a dominating player and a group of representative agents, each of which acts similarly and also interacts with each other through a mean field term being substantially influenced by the…
This paper studies an optimal investment-consumption problem for competitive agents with exponential or power utilities and a common finite time horizon. Each agent regards the average of habit formation and wealth from all peers as…
We formulate a stochastic game of mean field type where the agents solve optimal stopping problems and interact through the proportion of players that have already stopped. Working with a continuum of agents, typical equilibria become…
In many stochastic games stemming from financial models, the environment evolves with latent factors and there may be common noise across agents' states. Two classic examples are: (i) multi-agent trading on electronic exchanges, and (ii)…
Mean field games is a recent area of study introduced by Lions and Lasry in a series of seminal papers in 2006. Mean field games model situations of competition between large number of rational agents that play non-cooperative dynamic games…
For noncooperative games the mean field (MF) methodology provides decentralized strategies which yield Nash equilibria for large population systems in the asymptotic limit of an infinite (mass) population. The MF control laws use only the…
We consider a class of mean field games in which the agents interact through both their states and controls, and we focus on situations in which a generic agent tries to adjust her speed (control) to an average speed (the average is made in…
In Mean Field Games of Controls, the dynamics of the single agent is influenced not only by the distribution of the agents, as in the classical theory, but also by the distribution of their optimal strategies. In this paper, we study…
In many real-world large-scale decision problems, self-interested agents have individual dynamics and optimize their own long-term payoffs. Important examples include the competitive access to shared resources (e.g., roads, energy, or…
We introduce a mean field model for optimal holding of a representative agent of her peers as a natural expected scaling limit from the corresponding $N-$agent model. The induced mean field dynamics appear naturally in a form which is not…
This paper studies a large population dynamic game involving nonlinear stochastic dynamical systems with agents of the following mixed types: (i) a major agent, and (ii) a population of $N$ minor agents where $N$ is very large. The major…
The goal of the paper is to develop the theory of finite state mean field games with major and minor players when the state space of the game is finite. We introduce the finite player games and derive a mean field game formulation in the…
Many real-world problems modeled by stochastic games have huge state and/or action spaces, leading to the well-known curse of dimensionality. The complexity of the analysis of large-scale systems is dramatically reduced by exploiting mean…
We consider the mean-field game where each agent determines the optimal time to exit the game by solving an optimal stopping problem with reward function depending on the density of the state processes of agents still present in the game.…
Even when confronted with the same data, agents often disagree on a model of the real-world. Here, we address the question of how interacting heterogenous agents, who disagree on what model the real-world follows, optimize their trading…