Related papers: Bringing Belief Base Change into Dynamic Epistemic…
This paper presents an extension of temporal epistemic logic with operators that quantify over agent strategies. Unlike previous work on alternating temporal epistemic logic, the semantics works with systems whose states explicitly encode…
Darwiche and Pearl's seminal 1997 article outlined a number of baseline principles for a logic of iterated belief revision. These principles, the DP postulates, have been supplemented in a number of alternative ways. Most of the suggestions…
In the field of knowledge representation, the considered epistemic states are often based on propositional interpretations, also called worlds. E.g., epistemic states of agents can be modelled by ranking functions or total preorders on…
In this contribution we explore choice revision, a sort of belief change in which the new information is represented by a set of sentences and the agent could accept some of the sentences while rejecting the others. We propose a generalized…
Classical models of opinion dynamics assume human participants with bounded rationality and limited coordination. The rise of LLM-based agents introduces a qualitative shift: agents can now participate in online discussions at scale,…
Forgetting as a knowledge management operation deliberately ignores parts of the knowledge and beliefs of an agent, for various reasons. Forgetting has many facets, one may want to forget parts of the syntax, a proposition, or a…
We propose a method for an agent to revise its incomplete probabilistic beliefs when a new piece of propositional information is observed. In this work, an agent's beliefs are represented by a set of probabilistic formulae -- a belief base.…
A vast and interesting family of natural semantics for belief revision is defined. Suppose one is given a distance d between any two models. One may then define the revision of a theory K by a formula a as the theory defined by the set of…
In dynamic epistemic logic (Van Ditmarsch, Van Der Hoek, & Kooi, 2008) it is customary to use an action frame (Baltag & Moss, 2004; Baltag, Moss, & Solecki, 1998) to describe different views of a single action. In this article, action…
This paper is aimed at providing a uniform framework for reasoning about beliefs of multiple agents and their fusion. In the first part of the paper, we develop logics for reasoning about cautiously merged beliefs of agents with different…
This paper revisits the multi-agent epistemic logic presented in [10], where agents and sets of agents are replaced by abstract, intensional "names". We make three contributions. First, we study its model theory, providing adequate notions…
This paper studies the realizability of belief revision and belief contraction operators in epistemic spaces. We observe that AGM revision and AGM contraction operators for epistemic spaces are only realizable in precisely determined…
Many AI applications involve the interaction of multiple autonomous agents, requiring those agents to reason about their own beliefs, as well as those of other agents. However, planning involving nested beliefs is known to be…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper (Friedman & Halpern, 1997), we…
This paper is an original attempt to understand the foundations of economic reasoning. It endeavors to rigorously define the relationship between subjective interpretations and objective valuations of such interpretations in the context of…
Motivated reasoning - the idea that individuals processing information may be motivated to either arrive at accurate beliefs or arrive at desired conclusions - has been well-explored as a human phenomenon. However, it remains unclear…
While several BDI logics have been proposed in the area of Agent Programming, it is not clear how these logics are connected to the agent programs they are supposed to specify. More yet, the reasoning problems in these logics, being based…
Dynamic epistemic logics which model abilities of agents to make various announcements and influence each other's knowledge have been studied extensively in recent years. Two notable examples of such logics are Group Announcement Logic and…
The AGM recovery postulate says: assume a set of propositions X; assume that it is consistent and that it is closed under logical consequences; remove a belief P from the set minimally, but make sure that the resultant set is again some set…
While belief functions may be seen formally as a generalization of probabilistic distributions, the question of the interactions between belief functions and probability is still an issue in practice. This question is difficult, since the…