Related papers: Bringing Belief Base Change into Dynamic Epistemic…
We discuss conditionalisation for Accept-Desirability models in an abstract decision-making framework, where uncertain rewards live in a general linear space, and events are special projection operators on that linear space. This abstract…
We consider credibility-limited revision in the framework of belief change for epistemic spaces, permitting inconsistent belief sets and inconsistent beliefs. In this unrestricted setting, the class of credibility-limited revision operators…
We endow prioritised default logic (PDL) with argumentation semantics using the ASPIC+ framework for structured argumentation, and prove that the conclusions of the justified arguments are exactly the prioritised default extensions.…
We propose a new paradigm for Belief Change in which the new information is represented as sets of models, while the agent's body of knowledge is represented as a finite set of formulae, that is, a finite base. The focus on finiteness is…
Belief change is a fundamental problem in AI: Agents constantly have to update their beliefs to accommodate new observations. In recent years, there has been much work on axiomatic characterizations of belief change. We claim that a better…
Iterated Belief Change is the research area that investigates principles for the dynamics of beliefs over (possibly unlimited) many subsequent belief changes. In this paper, we demonstrate how iterated belief change is connected to…
The dynamics of belief and knowledge is one of the major components of any autonomous system that should be able to incorporate new pieces of information. In this paper, we argue that to apply rationality result of belief dynamics theory to…
Many applications of intelligent systems require reasoning about the mental states of agents in the domain. We may want to reason about an agent's beliefs, including beliefs about other agents; we may also want to reason about an agent's…
The study of belief change has been an active area in philosophy and AI. In recent years two special cases of belief change, belief revision and belief update, have been studied in detail. In a companion paper, we introduce a new framework…
The field of iterated belief change has focused mainly on revision, with the other main operator of AGM belief change theory, i.e. contraction, receiving relatively little attention. In this paper we extend the Harper Identity from…
The stability rule for belief, advocated by Leitgeb [Annals of Pure and Applied Logic 164, 2013], is a rule for rational acceptance that captures categorical belief in terms of $\textit{probabilistically stable propositions}$: propositions…
Choice revision is a sort of non-prioritized multiple revision, in which the agent partially accepts the new information represented by a set of sentences. We investigate the construction of choice revision based on a new approach to belief…
In this survey we review dynamic epistemic logics with modalities for quantification over information change. Of such logics we present complete axiomatizations, focussing on axioms involving the interaction between knowledge and such…
The increasing incorporation of Artificial Intelligence in the form of automated systems into decision-making procedures highlights not only the importance of decision theory for automated systems but also the need for these decision…
In real-world applications, knowledge bases consisting of all the information at hand for a specific domain, along with the current state of affairs, are bound to contain contradictory data coming from different sources, as well as data…
We present a general logical framework for reasoning about agents' cognitive attitudes of both epistemic type and motivational type. We show that it allows us to express a variety of relevant concepts for qualitative decision theory…
We address the problem of belief revision of logic programs, i.e., how to incorporate to a logic program P a new logic program Q. Based on the structure of SE interpretations, Delgrande et al. adapted the well-known AGM framework to logic…
This paper extends the applications of belief-networks to include the revision of belief commitments, i.e., the categorical acceptance of a subset of hypotheses which, together, constitute the most satisfactory explanation of the evidence…
We address the problem of belief change in (nonmonotonic) logic programming under answer set semantics. Unlike previous approaches to belief change in logic programming, our formal techniques are analogous to those of distance-based belief…
An approach to the revision of logic programs under the answer set semantics is presented. For programs P and Q, the goal is to determine the answer sets that correspond to the revision of P by Q, denoted P * Q. A fundamental principle of…