Related papers: Controlling network coordination games
We study the robust Nash equilibrium (RNE) for a class of games in communications systems and networks where the impact of users on each other is an additive function of their strategies. Each user measures this impact, which may be…
We initiate the study of a quantity that we call coordination complexity. In a distributed optimization problem, the information defining a problem instance is distributed among $n$ parties, who need to each choose an action, which jointly…
In this paper we establish a new connection between a class of 2-player nonzero-sum games of optimal stopping and certain $2$-player nonzero-sum games of singular control. We show that whenever a Nash equilibrium in the game of stopping is…
We study deterministic optimal control problems for differential games with finite horizon. We propose new approximations of the strategies in feedback form, and show error estimates and a convergence result of the value in some weak sense…
There are only limited classes of multi-player stochastic games in which independent learning is guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. Markov potential games are a key example of such classes. Prior work has outlined sets of…
In this paper two algorithms with the goal of generating the equilibrium set of the power allocation game first developed in \cite{allocation} are proposed. Based on the first algorithm, the geometric property of the pure strategy Nash…
We consider a class of multi-robot motion planning problems where each robot is associated with multiple objectives and decoupled task specifications. The problems are formulated as an open-loop non-cooperative differential game. A…
Nash equilibria provide a principled framework for modeling interactions in multi-agent decision-making and control. However, many equilibrium-seeking methods implicitly assume that each agent has access to the other agents' objectives and…
In this paper, we investigate Nash-regret minimization in congestion games, a class of games with benign theoretical structure and broad real-world applications. We first propose a centralized algorithm based on the optimism in the face of…
We consider a nonzero-sum N-player Markov game on an abstract measurable state space with compact metric action spaces. The payoff functions are bounded Carath\'eodory functions and the transitions of the system are assumed to have a…
This letter studies multi-agent reinforcement learning in partially observable Markov potential games. Solving this problem is challenging due to partial observability, decentralized information, and the curse of dimensionality. First, to…
We address payoff-based decentralized learning in infinite-horizon zero-sum Markov games. In this setting, each player makes decisions based solely on received rewards, without observing the opponent's strategy or actions nor sharing…
We examine the routing problem for self-interested vehicles using stochastic decision strategies. By approximating the road latency functions and a non-linear variable transformation, we frame the problem as an aggregative game. We…
In this article, we revisit a communication-control co-design problem for a class of two-player stochastic differential games on an infinite horizon. Each 'player' represents two active decision makers, namely a scheduler and a remote…
This paper studies the problem of intervention design for steering the actions of noncooperative players in quadratic network games to the social optimum. The players choose their actions with the aim of maximizing their individual payoff…
This paper considers a distributed gossip approach for finding a Nash equilibrium in networked games on graphs. In such games a player's cost function may be affected by the actions of any subset of players. An interference graph is…
We investigate the sensitivity of the Nash equilibrium of constrained network aggregative games to changes in exogenous parameters affecting the cost function of the players. This setting is motivated by two applications. The first is the…
We consider seeking a Nash equilibrium (NE) of a monotone game, played by dynamic agents which are modeled as a class of lower-triangular nonlinear uncertain dynamics with external disturbances. We establish a general framework that…
Network control refers to a very large and diverse set of problems including controllability of linear time-invariant dynamical systems, where the objective is to select an appropriate input to steer the network to a desired state. There…
We extend the construction of equilibria for linear-quadratic and mean-variance portfolio problems available in the literature to a large class of mean-field time-inconsistent stochastic control problems in continuous time. Our approach…