Related papers: Controlling network coordination games
We consider a system of single- or double integrator agents playing a generalized Nash game over a network, in a partial-information scenario. We address the generalized Nash equilibrium seeking problem by designing a fully-distributed…
In this paper, we study the problem of the distributed Nash equilibrium seeking of N-player games over jointly strongly connected switching networks. The action of each player is governed by a class of uncertain nonlinear systems. Our…
Correlated equilibrium generalizes Nash equilibrium by allowing a central coordinator to guide players' actions through shared recommendations, similar to how routing apps guide drivers. We investigate how a coordinator can learn a…
Computing Nash equilibrium policies is a central problem in multi-agent reinforcement learning that has received extensive attention both in theory and in practice. However, provable guarantees have been thus far either limited to fully…
In this paper we focus on noncooperative games with uncertain constraints coupling the agents' decisions. We consider a setting where bounded deviations of agents' decisions from the equilibrium are possible, and uncertain constraints are…
In single-agent Markov decision processes, an agent can optimize its policy based on the interaction with environment. In multi-player Markov games (MGs), however, the interaction is non-stationary due to the behaviors of other players, so…
Constrained Markov games offer a formal mathematical framework for modeling multi-agent reinforcement learning problems where the behavior of the agents is subject to constraints. In this work, we focus on the recently introduced class of…
We consider a class of two-player dynamic stochastic nonzero-sum games where the state transition and observation equations are linear, and the primitive random variables are Gaussian. Each controller acquires possibly different dynamic…
Consider a set of agents who play a network game repeatedly. Agents may not know the network. They may even be unaware that they are interacting with other agents in a network. Possibly, they just understand that their payoffs depend on an…
We study the fragmentation-coagulation (or merging and splitting) evolutionary control model as introduced recently by one of the authors, where $N$ small players can form coalitions to resist to the pressure exerted by the principal. It is…
In this paper, we study a distributed continuous-time design for aggregative games with coupled constraints in order to seek the generalized Nash equilibrium by a group of agents via simple local information exchange. To solve the problem,…
We study public goods games played on networks with possibly non-reciprocal relationships between players. Examples for this type of interactions include one-sided relationships, mutual but unequal relationships, and parasitism. It is well…
We study strategic games on weighted directed graphs, in which the payoff of a player is defined as the sum of the weights on the edges from players who chose the same strategy, augmented by a fixed non-negative integer bonus for picking a…
This paper proposes a distributed algorithm to find the Nash equilibrium in a class of non-cooperative convex games with partial-decision information. Our method employs a distributed projected gradient play approach alongside consensus…
We study the problem of achieving decentralized coordination by a group of strategic decision makers choosing to engage or not in a task in a stochastic setting. First, we define a class of symmetric utility games that encompass a broad…
Atomic congestion games are a classic topic in network design, routing, and algorithmic game theory, and are capable of modeling congestion and flow optimization tasks in various application areas. While both the price of anarchy for such…
In this Letter we propose a method to control a set of arbitrary nodes in a directed network such that they follow a synchronous trajectory which is, in general, not shared by the other units of the network. The problem is inspired to those…
We consider the framework of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on his own strategy and on the average population strategy. We focus on the case in which the agents are coupled not only via their cost…
In this paper we present a novel generic mapping between Graphical Games and Markov Random Fields so that pure Nash equilibria in the former can be found by statistical inference on the latter. Thus, the problem of deciding whether a…
Consider a strongly monotone game where the players' utility functions include a reward function and a linear term for each dimension, with coefficients that are controlled by the manager. Gradient play converges to a unique Nash…