Related papers: Screening of Informed and Uninformed Experts
We investigate the problem of a principal looking to contract an expert to provide a probability forecast for a categorical event. We assume all experts have a common public prior on the event's probability, but can form more accurate…
In various situations, decision makers face experts that may provide conflicting advice. This advice may be in the form of probabilistic forecasts over critical future events. We consider a setting where the two forecasters provide their…
A policy maker faces a sequence of unknown outcomes. At each stage two (self-proclaimed) experts provide probabilistic forecasts on the outcome in the next stage. A comparison test is a protocol for the policy maker to (eventually) decide…
We study a cheap-talk game where two experts first choose what information to acquire and then offer advice to a decision-maker whose actions affect the welfare of all. The experts cannot commit to reporting strategies. Yet, we show that…
In a real expert system, one may have unreliable, unconfident, conflicting estimates of the value for a particular parameter. It is important for decision making that the information present in this aggregate somehow find its way into use.…
We consider mechanisms for truthfully eliciting probabilistic predictions from a group of experts. The standard approach -- using a proper scoring rule to separately reward each expert -- is not robust to collusion: experts may collude to…
Consider the following belief change/merging scenario. A group of information sources gives a sequence of reports about the state of the world at various instances (e.g. different points in time). The true states at these instances are…
An expert seller chooses an experiment to influence a client's purchasing decision, but may manipulate the experiment result for personal gain. When credibility surpasses a critical threshold, the expert chooses a fully-revealing experiment…
We revisit Popper's falsifiability criterion. A tester hires a potential expert to produce a theory, offering payments contingent on the observed performance of the theory. In our model, instead of knowing the true data-generating process,…
A principal and an agent can launch a project under unanimous consent. Their individual payoffs from the project depend on an underlying state, and the agent privately knows his own preference. The principal can conduct a test to learn…
We study the merging and the testing of opinions in the context of a prediction model. In the absence of incentive problems, opinions can be tested and rejected, regardless of whether or not data produces consensus among Bayesian agents. In…
If two experts disagree on a test, we may conclude both cannot be 100 per cent correct. But if they completely agree, no possible evaluation can be excluded. This asymmetry in the utility of agreements versus disagreements is explored here…
Modern mathematics is built on the idea that proofs should be translatable into formal proofs, whose validity is an objective question, decidable by a computer. Yet, in practice, proofs are informal and may omit many details. An agent…
Experts' beliefs embody a present state of knowledge. It is desirable to take this knowledge into account when doing analyses or making decisions. Yet ranking experts based on the merit of their beliefs is a difficult task. In this paper we…
The survey is concerned with the issue of information transmission from experts to non-experts. Two main approaches to the use of experts can be traced. According to the game-theoretic approach expertise is a case of asymmetric information…
A central question of crowd-sourcing is how to elicit expertise from agents. This is even more difficult when answers cannot be directly verified. A key challenge is that sophisticated agents may strategically withhold effort or information…
Merging beliefs depends on the relative reliability of their sources. When unknown, assuming equal reliability is unwarranted. The solution proposed in this article is that every reliability profile is possible, and only what holds…
Distributed knowledge based applications in open domain rely on common sense information which is bound to be uncertain and incomplete. To draw the useful conclusions from ambiguous data, one must address uncertainties and conflicts…
The setting of a right-censored random sample subject to contamination is considered. In various fields, expert information is often available and used to overcome the contamination. This paper integrates expert knowledge into the…
An expert tells an advisee whether to take an action that may be good or bad. He may provide a condition under which to take the action. This condition predicts whether the action is good if and only if the expert is competent. Providing…